How and Understanding of the Second Personal Standpoint Can Change Our Understanding of the Law: Hart\u27s Unpublished Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism by Kar, Robin  B
HOW AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND PERSONAL STANDPOINT 
CAN CHANGE OUR UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE LAW:
OR
HART’S UNPUBLISHED RESPONSE 
TO EXCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM
Robin Bradley Kar*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. DARWALL AND THE SECOND PERSONAL STANDPOINT............................................. 7
A. Distinguishing the First from the Third Personal Perspective......................... 8
B. Reflections on the Second Personal Standpoint.............................................. 14
II. RAZ AND AN ENRICHED UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL AUTHORITY ........................ 22
A. Understanding Raz’s Contribution: Law’s Authority and Exclusionary    
Reasons ........................................................................................................... 23
B. Capturing, rather than Excluding, Law’s Authority from the Second Personal 
Standpoint ....................................................................................................... 28
C. Six Grounds for Adopting the New Account ................................................... 33
III. HART AND A RENEWED DIRECTION FOR LEGAL POSITIVISM.................................. 41
A. Locating the Deeper Tensions in Hart’s Views .............................................. 42
B. Ten Reasons to Change our View of Hart’s Basic Commitments................... 48
IV. SHAPIRO AND A MORE COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING        
OF HOW THE LAW FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIVES......................................................... 54
One of the most exciting, and, to my mind, potentially fecund modern 
developments in moral philosophy is due to a recent line of thought developed by the 
*
  Associate Professor of Jurisprudence and Law, Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. Deputy Director, 
Loyola Center for Interdisciplinary and Comparative Jurisprudence.  B.A. 1994, Harvard University; J.D. 
1997, Yale Law School; Ph.D. 2004 (Philosophy), University of Michigan; Law Clerk to the Honorable 
Sonia Sotomayor, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1998-1999; Law Clerk to the Honorable 
John G. Koeltl, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2001-2002.  This piece has 
profited enormously from conversations with Elizabeth Anderson, Thomas Blaylock, Marshall Cohen, 
Jules Coleman, Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, Brian Leiter, Peter Railton, David Velleman and Gideon 
Yaffe.  All remaining errors are mine.  Many thanks are also in order to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 
which funded parts of this project through a Newcombe Fellowship.
September 2005] Hart and the Second Person 2
philosopher Stephen Darwall.1  In a series of recent articles,2 soon to culminate in a full 
length book by Harvard University Press,3 Professor Darwall has begun pressing a 
seemingly innocuous and simple claim, one which may nevertheless have far-reaching 
implications for normative theory.  It is this: while moral and political philosophers have, 
for some time now, been clear about the distinction between the third personal 
perspective (of observation, cause and effect) and the first personal perspective (of 
deliberation), and have sometimes plumbed this distinction to great effect in their moral 
thought,4 they have typically been unaware—or at least insufficiently aware—of the 
distinctive and critical role that the second personal perspective plays in our practical 
lives.  The second personal perspective is the perspective from which we address one 
another with claims and grievances, or respond to such claims with apology, excuse or 
justification.5  It is the perspective I take up when I confront you in anger for a perceived 
wrong, or that you take up in response to me when you say I have no right to treat you 
that way, and, in Darwall’s view, it is a perspective irreducible to the other two.
In his recent work, Darwall has already developed a number of important 
implications of this distinction, which include, among other things, an enriched account 
of what awareness of our practical freedom amounts to6 and a distinctive foundation for 
1
  Professor Darwall is the John Dewey Collegiate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan.  
His research concerns the foundations of ethics, moral psychology, moral theory, and the history of these 
subjects.  Darwall has authored WELFARE AND RATIONAL CARE (Princeton 2002); PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS
(Westview 1988), THE BRITISH MORALISTS AND THE INTERNAL ‘OUGHT’ (Cambridge 1995); IMPARTIAL 
REASON (Cornell 1983); and numerous scholarly articles.   He is associate editor of the peer-reviewed 
journal Ethics and co-editor of Philosophers’ Imprint.  He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts 
and Science (“AAAS”) and has held the National Endowment for the Humanities (“NEH”) Fellowship on 
four occasions. 
2 See, e.g., Stephen Darwall, Respect and the Second Personal Standpoint, 78 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. 
ASSOC. (2004); Stephen Darwall, Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value, 113 ETHICS 468 (2003); 
Stephen Darwall, Autonomy in Modern Natural Law, in NEW ESSAYS ON THE H. OF AUTONOMY (Larry 
Krasnoff & Natalie Brender eds., 2003); Stephen Darwall, Because I Want It, 18 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 129 
(2001); Stephen Darwall, Fichte and the Second-Person Standpoint, INT’L YEARBOOK FOR GERMAN 
IDEALISM (forthcoming). 
3 STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Harvard, 
forthcoming 2006). 
4 See generally Stephen Darwall et al., Toward a Fin de Siècle Ethics 3, 9-12, in MORAL DISCOURSE AND 
PRACTICE  (Darwall et al. eds., 1997) (discussing so-called “practical reasoning theories,” which try to 
ground the objectivity of ethics or reasons for action by stressing discontinuities between practical 
reasoning and the sciences, and noting that the former is concerned only with reasons for action as they 
appear to agents deciding what to do).  As discussed more fully in Section II(B), infra, modern decision 
theoretic and economic models of rational action also presume this distinction.
5 See, e.g., Stephen Darwall, Psychology of the Second-Person Standpoint 2, in DARWALL, supra note 3. 
 
6 See, e.g., Stephen Darwall, Fichte and the Second Personal Standpoint 9, in DARWALL, supra note 3
(“[A]wareness of agency is only possible through a second-personal address that presupposes that rational 
persons have normative standing as such and that limiting their external freedom can be justified by 
second-personal reasons that presuppose this standing (and by reasons they can freely decide to limit 
themselves.”).
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moral obligation, which is much more robust than in most contemporary deontological 
thinking.7 He has also spent time carefully tracing out important precursors to his 
thoughts in the history of ethics8 and ensuring that his views make moral obligation out to 
be something we might actually be capable of attending and responding to, given a 
naturalistically sound moral psychology that is attentive to recent empirical 
developments.9  The force and validity of Darwall’s views on moral obligation are sure to 
become lively sources of debate within moral philosophy proper.  This Article argues that 
there is a further implication of Darwall’s work, one that is not yet understood and should 
be of primary importance to our understanding of the law.  To put the thesis in 
deliberately provocative terms, an understanding of the second personal standpoint will 
allow us to decipher Hart’s undeveloped but at least inchoately understood response to 
the exclusive legal positivists, thereby clarifying important aspects of the genuine 
relationship between law and morality.  
As is by now familiar, the exclusive legal positivists have developed an 
important series of arguments according to which it is inconsistent with the nature of 
legal authority, and law’s presumed practical guidance function, for the law to be 
identified on the basis of substantive moral criteria.10  An answer to these arguments is 
thus needed to maintain not only that legal officials can in principle identify the law by 
means of a social convention (or what Hart sometimes called a “rule of recognition”) that 
incorporates moral criteria—as Hart and other so-called “inclusive” legal positivists like 
Jules Coleman assert.11  An answer is also needed to maintain that legal officials seeking 
7 See Stephen Darwall, Second-Personal Reasons and the Dignity of Persons 12-16, in DARWALL, supra 
note 3 (arguing that essential features of obligation can only be vindicated from second personal 
standpoint) (observing problems that prior deontological theories have had in grounding obligation in first 
personal standpoint).  
8 See, e.g., Darwall, supra note 6 (discussing Fichte’s notion of reciprocal recognition as a form of second-
personal mutual awareness); DARWALL, supra note 3, Ch. 6 (discussing Adam Smith’s conception of the 
role of empathy in human thought and practice as implicitly second personal); THE SECOND PERSON 
DARWALL, supra note 3, Ch. 7 Interlude: Reid versus Hume on Justice”) (discussing Reid’s criticism of 
Hume in terms of the second personal standpoint) (noting that Margaret Gilbert’s conception of the plural 
subject may arise only once there is reciprocal second personal recognition) (referencing Tim Scanlon’s 
account of promising as implicitly second personal).   
9
  Darwall has squared his views with a number of contemporary empirical insights, including modern 
accounts of empathy; role-taking; Stanley Milgram’s famous experiments on obedience; Allan Gibbard’s 
evolutionary accounts of norm acceptance; empirical game theoretic findings concerning so-called 
“altruistic punishment” by Fehr, Schmidt and Gachter; and criminal justice studies by John Thibaut and 
LaurensWalker.  See generally Stephen Darwall, Psychology of the Second Personal Standpoint (on file 
with author) (paper delivered at University of Texas Moral; Psychology Conference). 
10
 The most important and influential versions of this argument are due to Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro.  
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 198-
221 (1994); Scott Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 149, 158, 177 (Jules Coleman ed., 
2001) (“[A]ny principle that satisfies a social rule of recognition simply by virtue of its moral content 
cannot guide conduct as a legal norm.”).
11
  This position is variously termed “incorporationism,” “soft positivism,“ or  “inclusive legal positivism” 
(“ILP”).  See W.J. Waluchow, Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis, 6 LEGAL THEORY 45, 45, 
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to identify the law must always interpret source based law in its best moral light—as 
Ronald Dworkin, and other so called “interpretivist” legal theorists contend.12  Beginning 
with The Model of Rules I,13 Dworkin has brought to our attention a rich set of 
phenomena suggesting that judges sometimes—or perhaps even always—rely on 
substantive moral insight to identify what the law is,14 and at issue is nothing less than 
whether this reliance can ever be part of the law, or grounded in law.  Hence, while this 
Article claims to trace out commitments that are implicit in Hart’s views, or that at least 
represent the best ways to harmonize Hart’s core philosophical commitments in light of 
recent advances in moral philosophy, the arguments in this Article should be welcome to 
more than just inclusive legal positivists.  They should be equally welcome to people, like 
Dworkin, who may see reason to abandon positivism altogether but may still like to 
absorb some of Raz’s useful insights about legal authority.  
I have already acknowledged that the thesis of this Article is stated in a 
deliberately provocative manner.  What exactly do I mean by this?  Notice that analytic 
jurisprudence is currently in a curious position.  There is now pretty much universal 
agreement in the field that Hart was the single most important philosopher of law of the 
20th century,15 as assessed not only by the direct impact he has had on others who have 
adopted various strains of his thought, or by the transformative and permanent effect he 
had on the state of the debate in jurisprudence, but also by the fact that the two most 
prominent alternatives to his inclusive legal positivist views were developed in direct 
response to core insights that he had.  These alternatives have already been mentioned.  
notes 2-4 and accompanying text (2000) (defining ILP, broadly, as the assertion that “morality can indeed 
play a key role in determining the existence and content of valid laws”); see also Jules Coleman, 
Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis,  in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 99, 100 
(Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“Very roughly, Incorporationism allows that morality can be a condition of 
legality: that the legality of norms can sometimes depend on their substantive (moral) merits, not just their 
pedigree or social source.”).  For definitive surveys of inclusive legal positivism or contemporary 
statements of the view, see Jules Coleman, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); W.J. WALUCHOW, 
INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994).
12
  For a compact introduction to this aspect of Dworkin’s views, see RONALD  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
87-113, 176-275 (1986).  As Hart has observed, Dworkin conceives the central task of legal theory as 
“consist[ing] in the identification of  the principles which both best ‘fit’ or cohere with the settled law and 
legal practice of a legal system and also provide the best justification for them, thus showing the law ‘in its 
best light.’”   H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 241 (Oxford 1994) (1961). 
13 The Model of Rules I, reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977).
14
  Dworkin presents this work in a series of articles, the most important of which are The Model of Rules I, 
The Model of Rules II, Hard Cases, and Taking Rights Seriously, all of which have been reprinted in 
DWORKIN, supra note 13.  
15
  As Leslie Green has noted, there is now “a realm of consensus about the way The Concept of Law
changed the direction of Anglo-American legal theory.  For one thing, it introduced and clarified a set of 
questions that came to dominate the literature . . . .  Hart also coined the idiom in which we debate the 
answers to such questions, [introducing] terms and distinctions [that] are now part of cultural literacy for 
legal theorists writing in English.”  The Concept of Law Revisited, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1687 (1996).   
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They are Dworkin’s interpretivist theory of law,16 and Raz’s exclusive legal positivist 
theory,17 which Scott Shapiro has more recently elaborated in important and influential 
(though somewhat distinctive) ways.18  Hart, however, remained largely silent in 
publication about his take on these major alternatives as they were developed and the 
motivations behind them shored up.19  We know that Hart thought he had responses of 
some kind, though, however inchoate or undeveloped.  This is apparent from his lengthy 
set of draft replies to critics, one half of which made their way into Hart’s posthumously 
published Postscript to The Concept of Law.20  But whereas Hart’s Postscript laid out in 
detail a point by point response to most of Dworkin’s main lines of criticism, Hart’s 
responses to the exclusive legal positivists never made it to print, in large part because 
they were deemed insufficiently developed for publication.21  Perhaps adding to the 
mystery, some of Hart’s later articles suggest that he was ready to absorb many of Raz’s 
insights on legal authority without thinking that they created any internal inconsistencies 
in his inclusive legal positivist views.22  This has led many to wonder: What might Hart 
have been thinking?  Did he have a substantive response to the exclusive legal positivists, 
however inchoate or undeveloped?  If so, is it a line of response to which Dworkineans or 
others might equally avail themselves?  What was Hart’s response to exclusive legal 
positivism anyway?
The received view has it that Hart may not have fully understood the depth 
of the inconsistencies between inclusive legal positivism and some of his other core 
16 Dworkin developed his interpretivist theory partly in response to Hart’s claim that officials identify the 
law by means of a social convention, arguing that conventional phenomena do not do justice to the many 
ways that substantive moral insight enters into our interpretations of the law.  See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, 
The Model of Rules II, in DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 46, 48-58.
17
  Raz developed his idea of exclusionary reasons in part to identify features he perceived were missing 
from Hart’s social practice theory of rules.  See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 58 (1999).
18 See Shapiro, supra note 10, at 149.  
19
  As Hart himself noted in his posthumously published Postscript to The Concept of Law, “Though I have 
fired a few shots across the bows of some of my critics . . . I have hitherto made no general comprehensive 
reply to any of them; I have preferred to watch and learn from a most instructive running debate in which 
some of the critics differed from others as much as they have differed from me.”  Id. at 238.  
20
  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
21
  The editor’s note to Hart’s Postscript says the following: “We found only hand-written notes intended 
for the second section , and they were too fragmentary and inchoate to be publishable.”  HART, supra note 
20, at iix.  Hart did, however, respond to another dimension of Raz’s work, namely, to the view that for a 
judge to sincerely believe that someone has a legal obligation the judge must believe or pretend to believe 
that the person is under a moral obligation.  See H.L.A. Hart, Legal Duty and Obligation, in HART, ESSAYS 
ON BENTHAM 127, 154-161 (1982).
22
  For example, while maintaining a commitment to inclusive legal positivism, Hart modified his views 
about the way rules guide conduct, later in his career, by clarifying that legal reasons are what he called 
“peremptory” reasons.  H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons 253, in HART, ESSAYS 
ON BENTHAM (1982).  Hart attributes his understanding of this phenomenon to Hobbes, but writes, “I do not 
think I should have seen the full importance of Hobbes’s remarks on these topics had I not had the benefit 
of the work of Joseph Raz on what he terms ‘exclusionary reasons’ which resembles in many respects the 
notion I have taken from Hobbes.”  Id. at 244.
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philosophical commitments.23  The most important of these is the so-called “practical 
difference thesis,”24 especially as elaborated in combination with Raz’s powerful insights 
about the nature of legal authority and the precise kind of practical difference that law 
must be capable of making in our lives.25  Hence, even Jules Coleman—the most 
prominent living inclusive legal positivist—has conceded that “[w]e do Hart no service 
by uncritically accepting his embrace of Incorporationism.”26  Coleman too thinks that 
there is an inconsistency lingering in the air.  He has even gone so far as to speculate on 
what Hart would have done if had recognized it, and to draw out what he—Coleman—
thinks are the relevant implications for a satisfying development of inclusive legal 
positivism.  Coleman has said: “Whereas I believe Hart is more likely to have abandoned 
Incorporationism, thus bringing his position considerably closer to Raz’s in crucial 
respects, I propose that we abandon or at least significantly modify the place of the 
Practical Difference Thesis within positivism.”27
I believe, on the other hand, that Hart sensed there was no genuine 
inconsistency, and for roughly the right reasons.  What Hart lacked—and what we have 
all lacked until now—is a clear account of what Darwall calls the second personal 
standpoint in order to develop and articulate this sense.  Section I of this Article thus 
discusses the relevant aspects of the needed account—which, importantly, include only 
structural features of the second personal standpoint and its importance in producing a 
satisfying meta-ethics of obligation.  By this, I mean an account of what it is to say that 
one has an obligation, regardless of what obligations we may (or may not) have.28  This 
23 See e.g., Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in
HART’S POSTSCRIPT 99, 101 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“Like many legal positivists who have embraced 
Incorporationism as a way of absorbing Dworkin’s insights and thereby meeting his objections, Hart did 
not fully appreciate the implications for his overall position of doing so.”).
24
  Coleman defines the practical difference thesis as “the claim that, in order to be law, authoritative 
pronouncements must in principle be capable of making a practical difference: a difference, that is, in the 
structure or content of deliberation or action.”  See Coleman, supra note 24, at 101.  Coleman also observes 
that “there is overwhelming textual and philosophical support for the view that . . . Hart accepts what I call 
the . . . Practical Difference Thes[is].”  Id.
25
  For classic exposition of these views, see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS (1999); 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 28-52 (1979); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM chs. 2-3 
(1986).   
26 Coleman, supra note 24, at 99, 101
27 Id.   Coleman has in some ways retreated from this position.   In The Practice of Principle, he accepts 
that the law must be capable of guiding action, but he argues that this need only be true of the law and not 
of each law.  See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 144 (2001).  This move allows him to 
maintain commitment to inclusive legal positivism, though it does in some ways still narrow the practical 
difference thesis.  Scott Shapiro has recently argued that this move cannot be used to produce a satisfying 
account of the way the law guides conduct.  See Scott Shapiro, Law, Morality and the Guidance of 
Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127, 168-169 (2000).  Importantly, the arguments in this Article will allow for a 
harmonization of inclusive legal positivism with a version of the practical difference thesis that need not be 
narrowed in this particular way.
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distinction will be important in what follows, because it means that none of the 
arguments in this Article depend on accepting any of Darwall’s more substantive 
normative positions or arguments.29
Section II then discusses Raz’s insights about legal authority.  It argues 
that, with an understanding of the second personal standpoint in hand, Raz’s insights can 
be absorbed without requiring acceptance of any of Raz’s more far-reaching conclusions.  
In particular, there is no need to accept his exclusive legal positivist claim that the law 
must be comprised only of source based law, which is identifiable wholly without 
recourse to moral evaluation.30  Section III pauses to discuss Hart’s views and core 
jurisprudential commitments.  It suggests that while there were some genuine tensions in 
Hart’s views, Hart implicitly understood the importance of something like the second 
personal standpoint in accounting for obligation throughout his career, and became even 
clearer by the end.  Although he lacked the vocabulary to articulate the consistency 
between his particular brand of inclusive legal positivism and some of Raz’s insights
about legal authority, he would have thus welcomed the arguments in this Article as 
appropriate developments of his view.  He would (or at least should) have thought of the 
views developed here as representing the best available framework for further 
refinements of positivist thought and debates between positivists and their critics over 
how to account for law.
Section IV, finally, ends with a discussion of Shapiro’s more recent and 
influential lines of argument in favor of exclusive legal positivism, and with a response.  
I. DARWALL AND THE SECOND PERSONAL STANDPOINT
What exactly is the second personal standpoint, and why might it be 
important?  We know that natural languages regularly contain distinct terms or markers 
for at least three persons.31  In English, the first person singular is the familiar “I”, the 
second person “You,” and the third person “He,” “She” or “It.”  But does the fact that 
these three persons recur so consistently in natural language, as basic grammatical 
categories, mark anything deep about our human modes of thought, or about the classes 
of questions and problems we are fated to face in human life?  Or are these merely 
adventitious features of language?  How, if at all, might philosophical reflection on these 
issues help us understand the law?
One helpful way to begin answering these questions is to start by 
distinguishing the first from the third personal perspectives.  This distinction is currently 
28
  For a good introduction to the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics, see generally 
STEPHEN DARWALL, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS (Westview Press 1997).
29 If, on the other hand, the meta-ethical arguments in this Article are successful, Darwall’s normative 
views may have important consequences for our understanding of legitimate legal authority as well.
30 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 215 (1994).
31
  Indeed, as Steven Pinker has noted, all natural languages tend to modify various words or constructions 
to reflect these distinctions in grammatical person as well.  STEVEN PINKER, WORDS AND RULES (1999).
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well understood in moral and political philosophy—though the distinction and its 
importance are not always fully appreciated in some legal academic circles.  Part A will 
thus clarify the distinction and use it to exemplify how philosophical reflection can 
produce insights useful to the law.  This discussion will set the stage for a more probing 
discussion, in Part B, of the second personal standpoint and how it is distinct from the 
other two.  Although this standpoint is currently less well understood, it is—for reasons 
to be discussed—absolutely central to many phenomena in the law.  Reflection on the 
second personal standpoint will thus be crucial for a complete understanding of the law, 
and this section will end by pointing to a number of such uses in substantive areas of the 
law.
A. Distinguishing the First from the Third Personal Perspective
The first and third personal perspectives are distinct from one another in a 
number of familiar ways that can be clarified by reflection.  The first personal 
perspective—or at least the part that this Article will be concerned with—is the 
perspective from which we ask, “How should I act?”  It is thus, at least in part, the 
practical perspective we employ to decide what to do.  The third personal perspective is, 
by contrast, the perspective from which we observe the world and make judgments like 
those of cause and effect (or consequence).  This is the perspective we take up when we 
engage in assertive discourse, including most discourse familiar from the sciences, and it 
is the perspective in which we collect our growing body of empirical knowledge.  
Though the grammatical forms are at least as old as our specifically human evolutionary 
history,32 we currently live in a period that has witnessed incredible recent advances in 
scientific understanding and method.  We are thus taught—rightly, in my view—to look 
to the sciences as providing a model of clear and objective thinking.   In the sciences, we 
are also told to eliminate the first person where possible, and that professional discoveries 
are to be framed wholly in the third person. 33
Importantly, not every use of a term that marks a particular grammatical 
person makes ineliminable reference to the correspondingly unique perspective we can 
take up in that language.  For example, I might ask you whether your friend is at work, 
not knowing that she is actually in the room.  Your friend might break in before you can 
answer and give the relevant response, saying, “No, I am off today.”  She would then be 
using the “I” to give essentially the same information that you could have given me third 
32 There is significant expert disagreement as to whether our linguistic capacities were specifically selected 
for, but most experts believe that our distinctively human linguistic capacities evolved somewhere between 
the Middle Pleistocene period—between 500,000 to 100,000 years ago—and the appearance of 
anatomically modern Homo Sapiens during the Upper Palaeolithic period—approximately 30,000 to 40,000 
years ago.  See, e.g., Leslie C. Aiello, Terrestriality, Bipedalism and the Origin of Language, in 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS IN PRIMATES AND MAN 269, 272-74 (W.G. Runciman et al. 
eds., 1996).  Most experts also agree that “relatively little evolution has occurred since humans became 
civilized (in about the last 10,000 years) and so much of our mental architecture is thought to have evolved 
in hunter-gatherer societies, and our minds are best adapted to such societies.”  Paul H. Rubin, Folk 
Economics (forthcoming) (on file with author).  
33 See, e.g., Council of Biology Editors, SCIENTIFIC STYLE AND FORMAT (6th ed. 1994); THE AMERICAN 
CHEMICAL SOCIETY STYLE GUIDE, A MANUAL FOR AUTHORS AND EDITORS (J.S. Dodd ed., 1997).
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personally by saying, “No, she is off today.”  She would be answering a fundamentally 
third personal question, and would be referring to herself in a manner that is reducible to 
third personal assertion, though with the indexical “I.”34   This is why her answer can be 
translated into purely third personal, assertive discourse without any relevant loss of 
meaning.35
There are, however, other uses of the first personal form that cannot be so 
translated—including most of the uses relevant to this Article.  When I ask, “What should 
I do?” from the first personal perspective of deliberation, I am not asking a question that 
can be fully captured in third personal language.  I am not, for example, merely seeking 
information about a host of related third personal facts about what I will do, or what I am 
likely to do, or even what the likely consequences of my actions might be.  I am asking 
what I should do, which seeks to identify my reasons for action, and, in doing so, I am 
asking a fundamentally first personal, practical question.36 Facts about the world stated 
third personally may, of course, provide me with such reasons, but these facts cannot be 
reasons simply in virtue of their truth as third personal statements.   This should be clear 
34
  See generally David Braun, Indexicals, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2001) (“Indexicals 
are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from utterance to utterance.  ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘he’, ‘she’, 
and ‘that’ are classic examples of indexicals.”).
35 I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the statement might not have other dimensions to it, in certain 
contexts we might imagine.  For example, the person making the statement might be using it to surprise the 
person with her presence (not just with its fact, but with her presence there), and this pragmatic dimension 
of the statement’s force would presumably not be so translatable. 
36
  R. Jay Wallace has thus explained that:
Practical reason defines a distinctive standpoint of reflection. When agents deliberate 
about action, they think about themselves and their situation in characteristic ways. What 
are some of the salient features of the practical point of view? . . . .  A natural way to 
interpret this point of view is to contrast it with the standpoint of theoretical reason. . . .  
One possibility is to understand theoretical reflection as reasoning about questions of 
explanation and prediction. Looking backward to events that have already taken place, it 
asks why they have occurred; looking forward, it attempts to determine what is going to 
happen in the future. In these ways, theoretical reflection is concerned with matters of 
fact and their explanation. Furthermore it treats these issues in impersonal terms that are 
accessible (in principle) to anyone.  Theoretical reasoning, understood along these lines, 
finds paradigmatic expression in the natural and social sciences. . . .  Practical reason, by 
contrast, takes a distinctively normative question as its starting point.  It typically asks, of 
a set of alternatives for action none of which has yet been performed, what one ought to 
do, or what it would be best to do. It is thus concerned not with matters of fact and their 
explanation, but with matters of value, of what it would be desirable to do. In practical 
reasoning agents attempt to assess and weigh their reasons for action, the considerations 
that speak for and against alternative courses of action that are open to them.  Moreover 
they do this from a distinctively first-personal point of view, one that is defined in terms 
of a practical predicament in which they find ourselves . . . .
R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2003).  Wallace also 
notes that there are alternative ways of understanding theoretical reasoning, which align it more closely 
with practical reasoning, only having a different subject matter—namely, what we ought to believe.  See id.
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from the following observation: when a third personal statement is true, that fact does not 
alone make it a reason for action.37
The foregoing discussion suggests that there is an important class of first 
personal questions, including those about how to act and live, which cannot be reduced to 
purely third personal questions.  What are we to make of this irreducibility?  There are 
skeptics of practical reason who claim to think that this irreducibility establishes that 
questions like “What should I do?” make no real sense and admit of no real answers.38
Interestingly enough, however, they are all skeptics who ask and answer the very same 
question numerous times in their daily lives, and in ways that show that they take 
seriously their capacities to do so on those occasions.  They thus reject the 
meaningfulness of the question in one frame of mind, while asking and answering it in all 
earnestness in many others.  What this stance amounts to, in the end, is not so much a 
general rejection of the questions, or even their meaningfulness, but rather a refusal to 
take seriously the contention that probing thought and reflection might deepen our 
practical, first personal insight.  
But one should not assume too blithely that our inability to fit our first 
personal questions into third personal discourse entails that reflection on the first personal 
standpoint in its own terms will yield no illumination.  Consider what a similar stance 
toward third personal, assertive discourse would have done to the development of the 
sciences.  Philosophical reflection gave birth to the natural sciences and has been 
instrumental to its development all along—including to our growing self-consciousness 
about its methods and how they operate to produce reliable knowledge. 39  Refusal to 
reflect on how third personal thought functions in its distinctive ways would not have 
been an instance of clear and objective thinking—though it may have hindered the 
development of the sciences and prevented us from generating important insights into 
37 See id.
38 See generally CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, Skepticism about Practical Reason, in CREATING THE KINGDOM
OF ENDS (1996).  This line of thought is often framed as if reason can only function in allowing us to 
discern true and false beliefs about the world, but never—or at least never fundamentally—in identifying 
things we ought to do.  The classic formulation of this view is often attributed to David Hume, and to his 
famous dictum that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them.”  DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 415. 
39
  For example, the Greeks did not distinguish philosophy from the natural sciences as we do, and 
philosophy was taken to encompass not just psychology and epistemology but also inquiries into physics.  
See, e.g., F.H. SANDBACH, THE STOICS 69 (2d ed. 1989).  Very little progress was made in the sciences 
between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Renaissance.  During the rise of the modern sciences in the 
17th century, Galileo—the oft cited “progenitor” of the modern sciences—developed many of his thoughts 
in explicit reaction to Artistotle’s conception of terrestrial matter.  See Peter Machamer, Galileo Galilei, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005).  Galileo considered himself a philosopher, and “[t]he 
philosophical thread that runs through Galileo’s intellectual life is a strong and increasing desire to find a 
new conception of what constitutes natural philosophy and how natural philosophy ought to be pursued.”  
Id.  Since the rise of the modern sciences, numerous people have produced works aiming to clarify through 
reflection the methods by which scientific knowledge “progresses”—including early works by Francis 
Bacon and Reneé Descarte—and/or aiming to undermine the idea that science “progresses” in such a 
simple way—including works by Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyeraband and Larry Laudan, among others.  See 
Ilkka Niiniluoto, Scientific Progress, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2002).
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how this important mode of thinking functions. Do our relatively recent successes in 
understanding, producing, and partly formalizing third personal thought really provide 
good grounds to refuse the same level of reflection to first personal questions about how 
to act and live?  In the law, there is, of course, probably no real way of avoiding the 
seriousness of these first personal, practical questions.  Still, these points seem 
worthwhile to make in the present context because much legal academic work and many 
legal professionals currently exhibit what seems to me an unwarranted degree of 
skepticism about the importance of such reflection in the law.  Skepticism of this kind 
can do damage to the law, to our understanding of what is distinctive about it, and to our 
ability to contribute meaningfully to it in the full range of possible ways.
As already noted, this Article will not concern itself primarily with the 
distinction between the first and third personal perspectives.  Before continuing, a brief 
example of how reflection on this distinction can prove useful to the law will nevertheless 
help set the stage for analogous claims about reflection on the second personal 
standpoint.  The example I will use is due to Christine Korsgaard.  
The above discussions should have already clarified how there is 
apparently no room for our resilient perception of the practical “I,” or for the answers to 
certain questions we face in deliberation, in a complete, third personal description of the 
world.  But—as Korsgaard has observed in Morality as Freedom40—the same point can 
in fact cut both ways.  When we ask “What should I do?,” we are—as already noted—
asking it a particular frame of mind, which operates under the idea that we have the 
practical freedom to respond appropriately to the answers we identify.41  There are, 
however, facts about the world that at first glance might seem to undermine our freedom 
to make such choices, facts that depend ultimately on what the world is like from a third 
personal perspective.  These are familiar facts about whether the natural world follows 
determinate causal laws or is causally indeterminate.  And it is sometimes thought that 
our answers to these questions have direct relevance to whether we can ever genuinely 
respond to reasons for action, and, hence, whether we can ever be deemed genuinely 
responsible for our actions.42  Indeed, some have argued that the legitimacy of our 
practices of criminal punishment depend, either wholly or in part, on abstract 
metaphysical questions like these.43
40
   Christine M. Korsgaard, Morality as Freedom, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 159-87 (1996).
41 See id. at 162 (“Kant argues that when you make a choice you must act ‘under the idea of freedom.’ He 
explains that ‘we cannot conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside 
with respect to its judgments.”).
42
  As Korsgaard has noted, normative views that assume our practical freedom have “often been criticized 
for [their] dependence on an untenable conception of freedom of the will.”  Id. at 159.
43
  For a good discussion of these issues, and a response that is related to the ones developed here, see 
generally Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Flybottle: The False Problem of Free Will and 
Determinism, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599 (2005).  As Westen has observed:
Legal scholars and lawyers also worry about free will and determinism, particularly in 
fields like criminal law that are predicated on notions personal responsibility.  Some 
criminal law scholars argue that, with time, science will reveal that more and more of 
human conduct is determined, thus leading, perhaps, to “nullifying the entire criminal 
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As Korsgaard has pointed out, however, careful reflection on the issues 
suggests that our answers to these third personal questions cannot really have the kind of 
relevance to first personal deliberation that we might sometimes imagine.44  Even if we 
learn what we will do, for example, or that what we will do is determined (or is not), we 
still have to decide what to do on numerous occasions.  We may, for example, face a 
decision between two courses of action, one of which we discover in the course of 
deliberation to be very self-destructive, and the other of which we therefore decide is the 
right course to pursue.  Our reasons for this conclusion would be wholly independent of 
any facts about causal determination: the reasons would go directly to the 
choiceworthiness of various courses of action, not to what might cause them.  And if we 
were to learn the unfortunate (third personal) fact that we will ultimately do the self-
destructive act instead, this would not show that we were wrong about what we we had 
reason to do.  Indeed, learning this may be an appropriate occasion for regret, which is an 
attitude toward our actions that carries with it an imputation that we have not done what 
we should.45  The fact that our first personal questions about what to do are irreducible to 
third personal questions of fact thus cuts both ways; and those who take third personal 
questions about causal determination to be capable of undermining the sense of our first 
personal deliberative questions are misconstruing the nature of the questions.46  There 
are, of course, genuine things that can undermine or mitigate our responsibility—like 
law.”  Others take a more cynical view. They contend that the framers of criminal law 
already believe that all human conduct is determined, and that when the law allows a few 
conspicuously distressed defendants, such as the criminally insane, to claim, “I couldn't 
control myself,” they do so as a sop in order to maintain the pretense that everyone else 
possesses free will.  
Id. at 600-01 (footnotes omitted).
44 See generally Korsgaard, supra note 40, at 162-63.
45
   Korsgaard puts the argument in the following way:
The point is not that you must believe that you are free, but that you must choose as if 
you were free.  It is important to see that this is quite consistent with believing yourself to 
be fully determined.  To make it vivid imagine you are participating in a scientific 
experiment, and you know that today your every move is programmed by an electronic 
device implanted in your brain.  The device is not going to bypass your thought 
processes, however, and make you move mechanically, but rather work through them: it 
will determine what you think.  Perhaps you get up and decide to spend the morning 
working.  You no sooner make the decision than it occurs to you that it must have been 
programmed.  We may imagine that in a spirit of rebellion you then decide to skip work 
and go shopping.  And then it occurs to you that that must have been programmed.  The 
important point here is that efforts to second guess the device cannot help you decide 
what to do.  They can only prevent you from making any decision.  In order to do 
anything, you must simply ignore the fact that you are programmed, and decide what to 
do – just as if you were free.
Id. at 162-63.
46
  Korsgaard thus speaks of a “failure to appreciate” the “radical nature of the distinction between 
theoretical and practical reason,” including “their respective domains of explanation and deliberation.”  Id.
at 160. 
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incapacity, duress, mistakes of fact, and the like—but general metaphysical questions 
about causal determination seem beside the point.  Notice, finally, that we cannot but ask 
and answer questions about what to do all the time.  It can thus be damaging to important 
and pervasive dimensions of our thinking to lose sight of what these questions are all 
about.
What philosophical reflection can produce in cases like this, then, is 
understanding—which is in no way reducible to a mere increase in knowledge about the 
world.47   Reflection can help us discern better what kinds of things are genuinely 
relevant to what, so that we do not misconstrue the types of questions we are asking, or 
conflate the types of problems we face in human life.  We clearly employ the first 
personal perspective all the time, not just in the law but in ordinary life.  It is all around 
us, and it permeates our lives.  But we can sometimes fail to recognize its distinctive 
features, and this can sometimes impair our first personal thought, or cause us to lose 
sight of how best to approach or respond to it.  We do this, in my view, when we 
conceive of ourselves and our thinking as thoroughly third personal—as if we were 
creatures whose only genuine mode of thought were aimed at the formation of beliefs 
about the world, and as if we were then fated to let our desires just push us around.  What 
would be missing from this view would be all of the thinking we clearly do about how to 
act and live, and all the important decisions that this thought—which is, again, irreducible 
to third personal thought—produces. 
Finally, although this is only one example, this example should help 
clarify how philosophical reflection might produce a specific kind of insight that might
prove helpful in practical areas like the law.  Recent developments in legal academia 
have witnessed a very positive turn towards empirical research.  The above example 
suggests, however, that for those who do not yet see what is distinctive about the first 
personal perspective of deliberation, the cure cannot come through the mere acquisition 
of more knowledge of third personal truths.  It must instead come in part from reflections 
like these, which can result in something that more closely resembles a gestalt shift.  
Reflection of this kind is, moreover, not only consistent with our goals of increasing our 
empirical knowledge but can also help clarify when and where such empirical insight is 
relevant—and, hence, when and where the questions that commonly arise in the law have 
an importantly different character.  This, ultimately, is the kind of gestalt shift that I 
believe Darwall’s work on the second personal standpoint can produce as well, but even 
this brief example should help clarify the role that philosophical reflection can play in 
changing our understanding of practical fields like the law.  
47
  This use of philosophical reflection is, in my view, closely related to the project typically associated with 
Wittgenstein, especially as propounded by Burton Dreben, who has said that genuine philosophy should not 
result in “theory” or “assertion,” but should instead result in “understanding.”  For an insightful and 
charitable reading of this project, which views it as consistent with important developments in political 
philosophy, see John Rawls, Afterword to FUTURE PASTS:  THE ANALYTIC TRADITION IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY PHILOSOPHY (Juliet Floyd & Sanford Shieh eds., 2001).
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B. Reflections on the Second Personal Standpoint
Whenever I begin to discuss the second personal standpoint with legal 
academics, the first question I invariably get is the natural one: “What exactly is the 
second personal standpoint?”  As indicated above, I believe that Darwall’s recent work in 
moral philosophy can help answer this question.  I also believe that his observations on 
the second personal standpoint can produce a gestalt shift of kinds, which will enrich our 
understanding of the law—our understanding of both how it functions, and what is 
distinctive about many of the questions we commonly face in legal thought and practice.  
To make good on this claim, one must, however, first clarify the common view that is 
subject to change.  It is a view about what kinds of reasons we respond to in practice.  
In legal academia, the dominant view on this topic—or perhaps it would 
be more accurate to say the “quorum” view—is represented most explicitly in the law and 
economics literature, with its familiar model of the so-called “rational actor.”48  This 
model distinguishes very clearly between our cognitive capacities to produce what are, in 
effect, reliable third personal beliefs about the world and the questions we commonly ask 
from the first personal perspective of deliberation.49  For example, the model in no way 
reduces our questions about reasons for action to mere identifications of true beliefs, and 
instead claims that these reasons arise out of a combination of such beliefs and 
preferences for various states of affair in the world.50  These preferences are used to give 
sense to the notion that we value some states of affair over others.  Deciding what we 
have most reason to do is then pictured as answering which, of our available options, is 
most likely to maximize our informed preferences—a question that has received formal 
treatment in recent decades by Bayesian decision theorists.51
This description should not be taken to suggest that the law and economics 
literature always explicitly acknowledges the precise nature of the distinction between the 
first and third personal standpoints, as discussed in the last subsection.  Still, this 
distinction is at least implicitly presupposed and put to important use in the familiar 
rational actor model.  
48 For descriptions of the rational actor model and a number of representative uses in legal academic work, 
see, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Legal Analysis of Economics: Solving the Problem of Rational Commitment, 79 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 471 (2004); STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 
(1985); JAAP C. HAGE, REASONING WITH RULES (1997); NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND 
LEGAL THEORY (1978); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
49 See, e.g., Peter Gardenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin, Introduction: Bayesian Decision Theory—Foundations 
and Problems, in DECISION, PROBABILITY AND UTILITY 1 (“[T]here are two main factors determining our 
decisions.  One is our wants or desires.  These determine the values or utilities of the possible outcomes of 
our decisions.  The other is our information or beliefs about what the world is like and how our possible 
actions will influence the world.  The beliefs determine the probabilities of the possible outcomes.  The 
main aims of a decision theory are, first, to provide models for how we handle our wants and our beliefs 
and, second, to account for how they combine into rational decisions.”).  
50 See id.
51 See, e.g., id.; JAMES JOYCE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF CAUSAL DECISION THEORY (1999) (Cambridge 
Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory).
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When rational choice theorists acknowledge the distinction between the 
first and third personal standpoints, they may nevertheless still exhibit an unwarranted 
degree of skepticism about how useful further reflection on the first personal perspective 
might prove in producing genuine practical insight.  The idea that desires produce reasons 
for action comes quite readily to mind, and can seem readily and intuitively graspable.  
Recent developments in decision theory have also helped us formalize this form of 
practical reasoning, and developments like these can thus lend air of credibility to the
conclusion that instrumental reasoning is the only form of trustworthy and reliable 
practical thought available to us.52  Still, it should be clear that the grounds thus far
stated—viz., concerning the initial intuitiveness of the idea that desires give rise to 
reasons for action, and the recent formalizations of instrumental reason—do not strictly 
speaking entail any conclusions about preferences providing us with our only reasons for 
action.  Hence, these grounds cannot on their own establish the unimportance of further 
reflection on the first personal perspective in its own terms.  
The rational actor model does, on the other hand, have a very different 
feature that speaks strongly in favor its importance and coherence as at least part of the 
correct picture.  Earlier discussions have suggested how important it can be to distinguish 
between our different uses of language, so that we do not misconstrue all of the problems 
we face in human life as fundamentally third personal problems, which seek to identify 
facts about the world.  As important as such care is, however, it is equally important that 
our credible thought—once properly construed—not commit us to the truth of any third 
personal views that are either inconsistent with or implausible in light of our developing 
naturalistic understanding of the world.53  Squaring our understanding of reasons for 
action in with the findings of science is, moreover, no small feat.  To see why, notice that 
we commonly cite reasons for action in explanation of our actions.54  When we do so, we 
explain our actions in terms of something we took to speak in favor of them at the time.55
If our views on what we have reason to do were to be understood in part as expressive of 
desires for certain states of affairs, then these desires could function in plausible and 
straightforward naturalistic explanations of our actions.56 The explanations would, 
52
  See e.g., MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 5-7 (1987) (describing 
intuitions that appear to drive belief-desire accounts of practical reasoning and some of their proponents).  
53
  For a classic set of arguments scrutinizing the objective purport of our ethical language on such grounds, 
see J.L. MACKIE, INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 38-40 (1977).
54
  For classic exposition, see Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND 
EVENTS 5-19 (1980).
55 See STEPHEN DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON 32-34 (1983) (dubbing this sense of “reason” an “agent’s 
reasons for action”).
56
  R. Jay Wallace has thus noted that an expressivist theory of this like will typically have the following 
virtues:
It is naturalistic metaphysically, insofar as it makes no commitment to the objective 
existence in the world of such allegedly questionable entities as values, norms, or reasons 
for action. If normative and evaluative claims do not represent genuine cognitive 
achievements, then their legitimacy does not depend on our postulating a realm of 
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moreover, be of the right kind, because they would be in terms of motives that, on the 
present assumptions, give sense to our thought that something spoke in favor of the 
desired outcome at the time.  For this reason, nothing in the rational actor model commits 
us to the view that there is some mysterious, independent realm of non-natural facts 
(about our reasons), which are irreducible to descriptive facts about the world but that 
nevertheless somehow causally interact with the world to produce actions.57  There would 
also be no puzzling question as to how we might have epistemological access to these 
perceived reasons, because our view that we had reasons to act would be accounted for in 
terms of expressions of desire, rather than beliefs about some independent realm of third 
personal facts.58  Factors like these represent deeper reasons for crediting the rational 
actor model as at least part of the correct picture.
There is, at present, no simple way to capture the full range of ways that 
this model of decision appears in legal academic thought and practice.  The basic picture 
can be developed in a number of different ways, which tend to render it more or less 
sophisticated or plausible.  Sometimes the picture is far less formal that the present 
discussion would suggest but nevertheless provides an underlying assumption about how 
things work in basic outline.  Informal pictures like these operate whenever people assess 
civil legislation primarily in terms of the incentives it produces, or evaluate criminal 
legislation primarily in terms of its deterrent effects.59  When, on the other hand, the 
picture is given more formal treatment and coupled with certain assumptions about the 
alleged impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons,60 orthodox efficiency 
maximization accounts of rational action and legal doctrine tend to emerge.61 More 
normative or evaluative facts to which those claims must be capable of corresponding. It 
is also naturalistic psychologically, insofar as it yields explanations of intentional human 
behavior that are basically continuous with explanations of the behavior of non-rational 
animals.
R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2003).  It is important to 
remember that, for reasons I have discussed elsewhere, expressivist theories like this can in principle be 
consistent with theories that attribute robust truth conditions to our normative talk.  See Robin Bradley Kar, 
The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
57
  For classic exposition of this potential problem for our normative language, see MACKIE, supra note 53, 
at 38-40 (arguing that we purport to be referring to objective properties when we use ethical language but 
that this view cannot be squared with the facts).  
58
  For classic discussion of this dimension of the problem, see id. at 41 (noting problems with the view that 
there might be non-natural “normative” facts that somehow causally interact with the world).  
59
 Paul H. Robinson and John M .Darley have, for example, noted that “[f]or the past several decades, the 
deterrence of crime has been a centerpiece of criminal law reform.  Lawmakers have sought to optimize the 
control of crime by devising a penalty-setting system that assigns criminal punishments of a magnitude 
sufficient to deter a thinking individual from committing a crime.”  The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).  
60 See e.g., Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635-41 (1938) 
(cited in Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 
VA. TAX  REV. 501 (1997)).
61 See e.g., Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 84-85 (1992).  
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recently, there have been a number of important developments in behavioral economics.62
These have made great strides in challenging the basic psychological assumption that we 
typically decide what to do on the rational actor model, and have collected important 
empirical findings that better characterize our human decision-making processes.63  Still, 
on the whole, even this literature tends to retain the model as an account of what we have 
most reason to do, and does not typically challenge the more basic idea that we are 
motivated solely by  beliefs about the world and desires for various states of affairs.64
In The Deep Structure of Law and Morality,65 I recently presented a 
number of evolutionary game theoretic arguments, and collected a number of 
contemporary psychological, sociological and anthropological findings, to suggest that 
this psychological picture is incomplete in a more fundamental way.  As discussed more 
fully in that Article, our psychologies include motivational attitudes that have as their 
objects not just states of affairs that we might produce—which is how “preferences” or 
“desires” are typically defined in the relevant literature.66  Our psychological repertoire 
also includes certain attitudes towards and expectations of specific persons and their 
conduct, which give rise to a distinctive class of perceived reasons for action in 
accordance with norms and perceived grounds for criticizing or reacting to their breach in 
specific ways.67  I have called one important class of these attitudes “obligata,” because 
they give rise to our sense of moral and legal obligation in my view.68  Importantly, 
attitudes like these also have what moral philosophers call an “agent-centered” dimension 
62
  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have, for example, developed the field of bounded rationality.  See 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  See generally also 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Franceso Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005);
Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 170-200 (2000) (discussing 
empirical evidence and modern attempts to account for some of it from within basic economic 
frameworks); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (citing 112 Q. J. ECON. No. 2, which contains a number of 
articles related to behavioral economics); Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-
Control, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 392 (1981) (on bounded willpower); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into 
Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993).
63 Id.
64
 For a good discussion of this fact, see Anderson, supra note 62, at 170-200 (2000) (arguing that a more 
fundamental shift is needed to capture the ways we respond to norms).
65
  84 TEX.L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
66 See generally Darwall, supra note 5, at 4 (“As they are usually understood in this literature, desires are 
always desires-that-p, where p is some possible state of the world . . . .”)
67 See 84 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).  In my view, these attitudes are what Hart was describing when 
he used the term “internal points of view,” as an integral part of our attitudes toward the law when we 
accept it as having its particular kind of authority.   See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d 
ed. 1994) (defining the internal point of view as concern with rules from the perspective of a member of a 
group, who accepts the rules as guides to conduct and as grounds for criticizing deviations).  
68
  84 TEX.L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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to them.  A requirement is “agent-centered” if in at least some circumstances it purports 
to give each agent a different aim or goal, namely that he or she fulfill a given 
requirement, even if by failing to do so he or she could cause two or more others to fulfill 
the requirement in equally weighty circumstances.69 If, for example, I believe I have a 
moral obligation to you to act respectfully toward your friends at an important social 
gathering, then this obligation to you would not seem to be discharged by the fact that I 
could cause two or more others to act respectfully toward their friends in equally weighty 
circumstances by acting the fool—and perhaps thereby teaching them just how hurtful 
such action can be.  Legal obligations typically function in the same way.  A father’s 
legal obligation to pay child support would not be extinguishable under law, for example, 
on the ground that that father might provide useful instruction to other fathers by failing 
miserably and publicly to support his child, thereby helping them to see just how 
important their obligations are.  As a number of people have observed, both common 
sense morality and the law are, in fact, replete with requirements that purport to provide 
us with agent-centered restrictions.70
There is, however, a notorious problem with trying to square these 
features of our moral and legal practice with the dominant model of rational action that 
pervades much of the current legal literature.71  The model gives clear sense to how we 
might have reason to produce certain states of affairs.  Reasoning in this way, we might 
also conclude that we have reason to set up and follow certain shared moral or legal rules, 
given their likely consequences for human welfare.  But if action in accordance with a 
rule were justifiable only on these grounds, then there would seem to be no good reason 
not to depart from the rules if by doing so we could get two or more others to comply 
with them in equally weighty circumstances.  Common sense morality and the law 
typically deny that this is the case, but it is hard to find a foundation for this denial in first 
personal instrumental reason.  In value theory, this problem is commonly referred to as 
the “problem of agent-centered restrictions.”72  Many who have understood this problem 
have concluded that there may be no way to justify persistent features of our moral and 
legal practices, including the perceived way that moral and legal obligations seem to bind 
us and give rise to agent-centered reasons for action.73  Upon close examination, there 
would seem to be no foundation, in particular, for our recurrent thoughts that we have 
obligations to specific persons.
It is at this point that Darwall’s reflections on the second personal 
standpoint can help change our understanding of the law, and produce helpful insight.  
Darwall defines the second personal standpoint as the standpoint from which we address 
69 See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 55 (1986); see also Stephen Darwall, Agent-Centered 
Restrictions from the Inside Out, reprinted in DEONTOLOGY 112, 112 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003).  
70 See e.g., Darwall, supra note 69, at 112; ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 73 
(1993).
71 See id. (discussing problem).
72 See id.
73 See, e.g., See, e.g., PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 54-55 (1986); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION 
OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 80 (1982).
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one another with claims or grievances, or respond to such claims with things like 
apology, justification, or excuse.74  It uses a distinctive grammatical person—which can 
be seen in our uses of things like commands and imperatives—and, as Darwall’s recent 
work has helped clarify, it engages a standpoint that is distinctive from both first personal 
deliberation, as so far described, and third personal observation.  
To see what is distinctive about the second personal standpoint, consider 
the thoroughly second-personal question I might ask you if I were to look you directly in 
your eyes, and say: “How could you have done that to me?”  There are (at least) two 
different ways that you might take this question and respond to it.  One way would be to 
see my question as doing nothing more than giving you fundamentally third personal 
information about the state of mind I am in—namely, a form of frustration or anger.  My 
question would certainly imply that I am in such a state.  You might then combine this
belief  with a number of pre-existing preferences for various states of affairs, which—let 
us stipulate—contain a preference to avoid my anger in this case.  Reasoning from this 
starting point, and from certain other beliefs you have about what it will take to appease 
my anger, you might think, “I should probably say the words ‘I’m sorry,’ or I will never 
hear the end of this.”  This might, in turn, lead you to decide to say the words, “I’m 
sorry.”  Your reasoning up until this point would be thoroughly first and third personal, in 
the senses presently under discussion.
But my question was not really meant just to give you third personal 
information about my state of mind.  Any person could have given you information of 
that kind, whereas my question was meant to address you directly, and take you to task 
for the perceived breach of an obligation that you owed to me.  This is something that 
only I could have done in this precise way with my question.  Complaints of this kind 
can, of course, also be answered in various ways, including through apology.  Still, the 
apology must be to me from you, and must be based on your acknowledgment that it is 
owed to me by you, for it to function as a genuine apology.  Both the relevant question 
and the relevant answer in this case are thus fundamentally second-personal, and, as 
Darwall has observed, “their second-personal character explains their agent-relativity.”75
Moreover, while it is true that these critical features of our sense of obligation cannot be 
reduced to or derived from first personal thought about how to achieve our various goals, 
the same point—once again—cuts both ways.  It suggests that we are misconstruing the 
nature of these problems by trying to fit them into the model of first personal deliberation 
as elaborated in the rational actor model.  These problems are instead inherently 
relational: they engage forms of interpersonal address that allow us to negotiate, manage, 
repair—and sometimes dissolve—our social relationships with one another.  
Once these facts have been acknowledged, it should become clear just
how pervasive the second personal standpoint and second personal thinking are in both 
morality and the law.  In our day to day lives, we commonly address one another with 
agent-centered reminders, or demands, backed by the perceived authority of morality or 
law.  These can range anywhere from relatively innocent phenomena, where for example 
we may let someone know that he has picked up our piece of luggage rather than his by 
74 See, e.g., Darwall, supra note 66.
75 Id.
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mistake, to much more charged demands, where for example we may threaten to call the 
police if a menacing person does not leave the premises immediately.  When we address 
one another in these ways, our second personal interactions sometimes end in an adequate 
resolution of the problem (the luggage is returned, say, or the person leaves or shows an 
official badge).  At other times, however, disputes arise, and continue, and can end up in 
court.  Here, the basic form of civil action begins with the Complaint—which states the 
relevant causes of action and ends with a demand for relief—and which is met with an 
Answer, which will include any defenses one might wish to raise.  These are nothing 
more than legal analogues of the moral complaint I made to you in the above example 
and the answer you gave to me by apologizing (and perhaps trying to make things up to 
me).  The basic form of criminal prosecution also begins with a charge, which is a 
second-personal form of address to the defendant, and is met with a defense that 
implicitly concedes the authority of the law to issue in agent-centered criminal 
obligations.  
In morality, analogous forms of moral charge and defense arise.  They are 
typically imbued with life by the moral emotions—by things like blame, resentment, 
moral indignation, and guilt.  As Darwall has noted, these attitudes are, however, all 
implicitly second personal.76  A careful look at our moral and legal practices thus 
suggests that second personal forms of interaction are in no way peripheral, and are 
instead the mainstay, of these normative practices.  We therefore misconstrue central 
aspects of common moral and legal problems, and what many of our interactions are all 
about in important areas of social life, if we think that the only practical questions that are 
live for us are first personal question about what to do to achieve our various goals.  What 
is missing from this picture—and what is thus missing from the now-dominant rational 
actor model and its near cousins in so much current legal thought—is all of the common 
and irreducibly second personal thinking we engage in when we ask whether someone 
has the standing to raise a particular claim, whether we have the right to react to others in 
the ways we do, whether an apology or compensation is warranted for a given action, and 
the like.  Questions like these form a distinctive class of human problems, which invite a 
particular species of answer, and it is these special problems that give morality and law so 
much of their distinctive lives.  
As indicated earlier, the primary purpose of this Article will be to trace out 
how an understanding of the second personal standpoint can help unravel certain central 
questions in analytic jurisprudence.  The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that an 
understanding of the second personal standpoint might be useful for untangling a much 
broader set of legal issues.  Before turning, in the next section, to this Article’s central 
task, it will therefore be useful to pause for a moment to give some indication of these 
broader consequences.  The remainder of this section will touch briefly on three
possibilities, by way of illustration.
First, in a recent and thought-provoking Article, criminal law theorist 
Alexandra Natapoff has traced a number of ways that the Miranda doctrine—which 
purports to provide criminal defendants with a purely beneficial and prophylactic right to 
remain silent and to speak primarily through counsel—has served to silence criminal 
defendants and effectively extricate them from many of the workings of the criminal 
76 See id. at 2-15.
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process.77 Natapoff argues that in our zeal to protect criminal defendants, we may be 
overlooking some of the losses that this silence generates, even to criminal defendants.  
She therefore outlines some of these potential losses and pleads for a renewed 
investigation into this issue.  
Although Natapoff does not frame the problem in the precise terms 
offered here, one of the implications of her work is that many of the second personal 
forms of address that may engage natural attitudes that can lead to things like 
reconciliation or reintegration may be disappearing from our criminal process.  This 
disappearance may, in turn, help explain why rates of recidivism are so high in countries 
like the United States, and so much lower in places like Japan, where practices of 
criminal punishment include things like “reintegrative shaming,” which engage deeply 
second personal forms of address.78 As long as we remain wedded to dominant 
paradigms of practical reasoning, however, it can be hard to put our finger on what 
exactly is being lost here.  The relevant loss may not be measurable, for example, simply 
in terms of the accuracy or number of accurate prosecutions (on the State side), or in 
terms of obtaining the shortest or most highly preferred sentences (on the defendant’s 
side), or even in terms of the potential deterrence effects of criminal legislation.  
Ultimately, the greatest loss may lie in the quality of relations we have with one another, 
as partly engendered by criminal process, and in an inability to genuinely integrate 
various valuable subcultures into mainstream society.   
Second, in The Textualization of Precedent,79 the linguist and legal 
theorist Peter Tiersma has recently traced out a number of ways that judicial decisions in 
the United States have slowly been transforming from oral bench decisions, which were 
sometimes recorded by court reporters or others in essentially non-authoritative written 
forms, into full-blown written and authoritative texts that are crafted by judges.  
Concomitant with this has been the rise of legal formalism as an interpretive 
methodology, which aims to interpret these judicial pronouncements as presenting us 
with fairly general statements of the law, which are importantly divorced from factual 
circumstance.  Although Tiersma does not—once again—frame his discussion in terms of 
the second personal standpoint, the oral decisions he describes were essentially decisions 
addressed to specific parties in all their concrete particularity.  In contexts of 
interpersonal address like this, basic conversational maxims would have rendered the 
judges’ relevant statements of reasons to include only those that were not already clear to 
both parties.  Understanding that judicial decisions functioned in this way would, in turn,
have invited a relationship to prior precedent that was less formalistic, and much more 
intent on harmonizing the underlying rationales and purposes behind prior decisions, and 
making relevant distinctions, where needed, to capture their true meaning and import in 
relation to novel fact patterns.  A very different interpretive methodology and relationship 
to precedent would, on the other hand, be required if judicial decisions were viewed more 
77
  Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005).
78
  For classic discussions of reintegrative shaming, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND 
REINTEGRATION (1989); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999).
79
  Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent (March 2005) (forthcoming) (on file with author).  
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as a series of abstract and fundamentally third personal, authoritative statements about the 
content of the law.  So we might ask: could a failure to understand specific dimensions of 
the second-personal standpoint, and how it arises in adjudication, be doing damage to 
important features of common law adjudication?  Might a failure to understand important 
aspects of how judicial decisions typically function be causing us to lose sight of our 
ordinary routes to judicial success?  
Finally, consider the more well-known accounts of tort law in terms of 
corrective justice.80  These accounts are meant to provide an alternative to efficiency 
maximization accounts of tort law, and one of the central claims that corrective justice 
theorists typically make is that there are dimensions of our tort obligations that cannot be 
accounted for in terms of efficiency maximization.  One such important dimension is the 
fact that we owe a duty of care to specific persons who we may have harmed, and, hence, 
the adjudication of tort claims is not typically viewed simply as an occasion to make
decisions that might maximize human welfare.  It is instead viewed as an occasion to 
decide whether that duty has been breached in relation to a specific person, and, hence, 
whether the defendant has a specific duty to the plaintiff to compensate for any harmful 
consequences.81  Although corrective justice theories do not use the specific terminology 
suggested here, one way of understanding these issues is to say that what is missing from 
efficiency maximization theories is an understanding of the thoroughly agent-centered 
and second personal features of tort law.  In failing to understand these features, there 
can, moreover, be a concomitant tendency—even among corrective justice theorists—to 
think of tort law’s duty of care to be reducible to an agent-neutral, instrumental duty to be 
careful to avoid certain harmful consequences.  A reexamination of these issues with the 
aid of contemporary work on the second personal standpoint might allow us to ask 
whether the duty of care is not better understood in different terms: as an agent-centered 
duty to care for others, and their interests and concerns, in at least a minimally 
appropriate manner, and to show this care either by avoiding certain harms or by making 
amends when one has failed in that respect.  What can be lost, then, in accounting for tort 
law in purely economic terms is the importance that these practices play in allowing us to 
maintain and repair our relationships with one another.  
These last three examples are meant only to be suggestive.  The next 
section turns to a more thoroughly worked out application of Darwall’s work on the 
second personal standpoint to some of the central questions in analytic jurisprudence.
II. RAZ AND AN ENRICHED UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
With some understanding of how the second personal standpoint is 
distinctive, we can now turn to a more probing discussion of Raz and some of the central 
debates in analytic jurisprudence.  Raz’s corpus of work is both rich and far-ranging.  
There would be no way, in an Article like this, to address the full set of considerations 
80 See generally Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One’s Neighbors, 77
IOWA L. REV. (1992).
81 See e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992);  
JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 1 - 63 (2001).
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that motivate Raz’s particular brand of exclusive legal positivism.  Still, one strand of his 
work has been most influential and central for the development of exclusive legal 
positivism.  This is Raz’s work on legal authority and “exclusionary” reasons;82 and his 
subsequent use of this work to argue that it would be inconsistent with the nature of legal 
authority, and with the precise kind of practical guidance the law purports to provide us 
with, for the law to be identified by means of a social convention that incorporates moral 
criteria.83  Because this last proposition is what inclusive legal positivists like Hart and 
Coleman assert as partly definitive of their view, these arguments are central to important 
and contemporary debates within positivism.  Moreover, as indicated in the introduction, 
this strand of Raz’s work would—if valid—undermine a number of non-positivist views 
of the law as well—including Dworkin’s “interpretivist” view, which claims that judges 
must interpret the law in its best moral light. 84  An assessment of these arguments is thus 
equally critical to larger contemporary debates between the positivists and their rivals on 
how to understand the law.  This section will focus on these particular Razean arguments.  
In my view, Raz’s work on legal authority—which includes his familiar 
work on exclusionary reasons—points to an important phenomenon that should be fit into 
any satisfying account of the law.  This section thus describes that phenomenon and why 
it is important.  It then argues that Raz’s particular account of the phenomenon has 
nevertheless been hampered by an attempt to account for it in wholly first personal terms.  
For reasons to be discussed, our understanding of the phenomenon will be enriched by 
contemporary reflection on the second personal standpoint.  This reflection will both 
clarify further what legal authority is, and allow us to absorb Raz’s important insights 
about it without following him to his exclusive legal positivist conclusions.
A. Understanding Raz’s Contribution: Law’s Authority and Exclusionary 
Reasons
One of Raz’s great contributions to jurisprudence has been to clarify an 
important dimension of the non-optionality that legal obligations claim for themselves.  
As Hart famously observed in The Concept of Law, “[t]he most prominent general feature 
of law at all times and places is that its existence means that certain kinds of human 
conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory.”85  It can nevertheless be 
much more difficult to identify what precisely this non-optionality of legal obligation 
consists in. 
82 See generally JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-48 (1999) (1975).
83
  See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 194-221 (1994); 
Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, in AUTHORITY 115 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 22-33 (1979).
84 See generally RONALD  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE ch. 3 (1986).
85 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis in original).
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In The Concept of Law, Hart himself offered important early illumination 
on this issue by elaborating his well-known “social practice” account of obligation—an 
account that he thought had application to obligations of all kinds.  As Hart saw the 
problem at the time, the primary difficulty was to account for the intuitive distinction we 
make between situations involving mere convergent behavior and situations involving 
genuine rule following.86  He proposed that we do this by observing that the latter 
situation involves a more complex psychology on the part of the relevant rule followers.87
Hart called this psychology the “internal point of view,” and he defined it—in his early 
work—as the critical reflective attitude that persons have toward a standard for action 
when they take it as a guide (or what we would now call a reason) for action, which 
applies generally to the members of a group, and also as a ground for criticizing 
deviations by those members.88  When people take up the internal point of view toward a 
shared rule, and this attitude generates the convergent behavior, they can be understood 
as following a rule in a way that people who merely converge in behavior cannot.  The 
internal point of view can thus be used to make the distinction that Hart was concerned 
with, and thereby clarify one dimension of the non-optionality that we commonly 
perceive obligations to have.  
As Raz has pointed out, however, this account does not yet go far enough 
to capture the full sense of non-optionality that is at issue with legal obligations.89  The 
problem, as Raz has usefully highlighted, is that reference to the internal point of view as 
so far defined does not yet allow for another important and intuitive distinction.  This is 
the distinction between situations in which the members of a group believe there is an 
ordinary reason to act, which reason applies generally to all similarly situated persons, 
and situations in which the members of the group believe that the action is in some 
further sense required.90
To illustrate with an example from the last section, consider a hypothetical 
group of orthodox rational choice theorists or economists who sincerely believe that each 
person has a reason to maximize his or her individual preferences and no other reasons 
for action.  We might stipulate, in addition, that this shared belief consists in the fact that 
the members take up the internal point of view toward a standard of self-interest 
86 See, e.g., id. at 10 (“What then is the crucial difference between merely convergent habitual behaviour in 
a social group and the existence of a rule of which the existence of the words ‘must’, ‘should’, ‘ought to’ 
are often a sign?  Here indeed legal theorists have been divided, especially in our own day when several 
things have forced this issue to the front.”) .
87 Id. at 57 (“What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of 
behaviour as a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), 
demands for conformity, and in acknowledgments that such criticism and demands are justified, all of 
which find their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should’, 
and ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’”). 
88
   For Hart’s early descriptions of the internal point of view, see id. at 55-57, 79-91.
89
  Raz presented his early criticisms of Hart, concerning Hart’s failure to take account of the exclusionary 
character of legal reasons, in Raz, supra note 82, at 35-58.
90 See e.g., id. at 80-85 (elaborating on Raz’s earlier criticism of Hart’s practice theory of norms). 
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maximization: they take the standard not only as a guide to individual action but also as a 
ground for criticizing deviations (as failures of rationality).  It is still perfectly possible—
indeed likely—that none of these persons would take self-interest maximization to be 
obligatory.  The standard—after all—merely purports to articulate what each person has 
most reason to do, not what each must do.  But if the internal point of view is present in 
situations like these while a sense of obligation is not, then the internal point of view—as 
thus far defined—cannot be enough to capture the full sense in which we commonly take 
obligations to provide us with requirements of action. 
To fill this gap, Raz proposes that we examine more closely the precise 
kinds of reasons that people commonly take obligations to provide them with.91  Raz 
suggests that people who perceive themselves to be under an obligation differ from 
people like our hypothetical rational choice theorists insofar as the former take the 
obligation in question to give rise not only to ordinary reasons for action but also to what 
he calls “exclusionary reasons.”  Raz defines these as any reason not to act on some other 
class of ordinary reasons.92  Exclusionary reasons are a species of what Raz calls 
“secondary reasons” for action, and, in ways to be discussed, they function in distinctive 
ways in our practical reasoning.93
Many common examples can be used to illustrate this phenomenon.  An 
ordinary person who has made a promise supported by consideration will, for example, 
commonly find herself faced with a number of ordinary reasons not to fulfill her promise 
later on down the road, which reasons typically arise from self interest.  If, however, the 
person has a moral and legal obligation to fulfill that promise, then, in ordinary 
circumstances, both morality and law will provide the person not only with reasons to 
fulfill the promise but also with reasons not to act on at least some of those other self-
interested reasons.  These reasons not to act out of self-interest are exclusionary reasons, 
in Raz’s sense.  Moreover, if we are to credit these legal and moral reasons as having the 
precise kind of authority that law and morality purport to have, then it would seem that 
we must think of them as having the authority to exclude at least some reasons arising 
from self interest.  Thinking of moral and legal reasons in this way would seem needed, 
for example, to distinguish us in the right way from our hypothetical rational choice 
theorists and how they view their standard of action.  We—after all—typically think of 
ourselves as in some sense required to follow through with our promise, and do not just 
think of the promise as one reason to be weighed in with (and that can perhaps be 
outweighed by) all the rest.  A reference to exclusionary reasons helps capture this further 
thought.  
In my view, one sign of the strength of Raz’s analysis is that it can bring 
into vivid relief an important structural feature that obligations of many kinds appear to 
have.  As the last example suggests, it is not only law but also morality that purports to 
91 See id. at 15-49.
92
  Id. at 39.  
93 Id. at 39 (“A second-order reason is any reason to act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason.  
An exclusionary reason is a second-order reason to refrain from acting for some reason.”).  Elsewhere, Raz 
discusses the apparent paradox of having “reasons for not being guided by reasons whose very nature is
that they should guide.”  Id. at 183-86.
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provide us with obligations that are in some sense non-optional.  Moral philosophers have 
in fact written extensively about this topic, and they typically refer to it by saying that 
moral imperatives purport to be “categorical.”94  But, as the prominent moral philosopher 
David Brink has usefully observed, this common claim can in fact be broken down into 
three further ones.  To say that moral obligations are “categorical” is to say that they have 
at least the following three properties: they are (i) “inescapable,” in that their application 
to persons does not depend on that person’s contingent desires, inclinations or interests; 
they have (ii) “authority,” in that they provide each person with reasons to act that are 
independent of that person’s antecedent aims, desires or interests; and they are (iii) 
“supreme,” in that the reasons they give rise to are imperative or overriding of any arising 
from a person’s antecedent aims, desires or interests.95
Notice several points about this more fine-grained account of the structure 
of moral obligation.  First, the term “inescapability”—from element (i)—refers to a 
species of generality of application, and the term “authority”—from element (ii), and 
which is not to be confused with Raz’s use of the term “authority”—refers here to the fact 
that morality purports gives rise to reasons for action.  Both of these features are thus part 
of Hart’s early conception of the internal point of view.96  Second, the term 
“supremacy”—from element (iii)—refers to the fact that moral reasons are commonly 
taken to be strictly overriding, which is to say that they have the authority to exclude all 
other reasons for action.97  Third, for reasons already discussed, it would seem difficult—
if not impossible—to account for the full sense in which morality purports to give rise to 
obligations without incorporating something like this third, exclusionary element.  
The notion of an exclusionary reason is, however, a more general notion 
than that of supremacy.  As Raz defines the term, “exclusionary reasons” can differ in 
scope, and can thus exclude all or only some other reasons that might apply in a given 
situation.98 The concept of an exclusionary reason might thus be used to account for the 
obligatory nature of a number of non-moral obligations, which we do not typically think 
of as strictly overriding.  A plausible list would include things like social obligations, 
professional obligations, obligations to friends, and—of course—legal obligations.  Some 
people have argued that morality itself should not, in fact, be understood as strictly 
overriding.99  If they are right, but still want to claim that morality gives rise to 
obligations of some more limited kind (i.e., as opposed to just reasons to follow rules), 
94 See generally, David O. Brink, Kantian  Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy, in 
ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASON 255, 259-61 (Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut eds., 1997).
95
   Brink, supra note 94, at 255, 255.
96 See, e.g., HART, supra note 85, at 89 (defining the internal point of view as concern with rules of 
conduct from the perspective of a member of group who accepts them as general guides for conduct and as 
grounds for criticizing deviations).  
97
  Brink, supra note 94. 
98 See RAZ, supra note 82, at 40.
99 See e.g., Phillipa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81 PHIL. REV. 305, 305 
(1972).  Foot later revised her views, however, in Philippa Foot, Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a 
Mistake?, 15 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1-14 (1995).
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then the concept of an exclusionary reason might be used to clarify their position and 
crystallize what exactly is at stake.  Facts like these suggest to me that Raz’s notion of an 
exclusionary reason is framed at the right level of generality to characterize a distinctive 
and structural feature of obligation in many forms.  Indeed, when Raz first develops the 
notion, he uses it to account for the distinctive perceived reason-giving force that a host 
of phenomena have—from rules and legally authoritative directives to much more 
ordinary and garden-variety plans and commitments.100
At this level of generality, one concerned to absorb both Hart’s and Raz’s 
contributions to our understanding of obligation might therefore take the following tack: 
one might try to build reference to exclusionary reasons into one’s understanding of the 
internal point of view, at least as it applies to legal directives that give rise to obligations.  
This is, in effect, what Hart did later in his career.  In Commands and Legally 
Authoritative Reasons, Hart amends his view in The Concept of Law by adding that when 
we take up the internal point of view toward legal obligations, we take them as providing 
not just any guide to action but rather with guides that are both “peremptory” and 
“content-independent.”101  He describes “peremptory” reasons in strongly Razean 
language, and—although he credits Hobbes as first raising the issue to his attention—he 
acknowledges that Raz helped him understand the nature and importance of this 
dimension of the law.102  In my view, this absorption of Raz’s work is both needed and 
appropriate.  
It will be helpful to pause, finally, to remind ourselves of what the 
foregoing arguments are about before continuing.  I have said on a number of occasions 
that the features of moral and legal authority presently under discussion are “structural.”  
In the Introduction, I similarly said that this Article would be concerned only with a 
“meta-ethics” of obligation.  By using these terms, I mean to say that arguments like the 
ones in this section aim to clarify what we mean when we say or believe that we are 
under an obligation—and how such perceived obligations function in our lives—but not 
(or at least not directly) what obligations we actually have.103  It is, of course, possible to 
think that there is a connection between these two questions.  Kant, for example, 
famously argues that only one moral standard—namely, his categorical imperative—can 
have the precise authority that common sense morality purports to have.104  But these 
normative questions are still in principle separable from meta-ethical ones, and one need 
not agree that there is any such connection.  It is useful, I think, to understand Raz’s work 
as pointing out structural features of obligation as well,105 and, hence, as contributing in 
100 See RAZ, supra note 82, at 35- 39.
101 See H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 243, 243 
(1982).
102 Id. at 244.
103 See generally STEPHEN DARWALL, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS (1998).
104 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.., 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) (1785).
105
  Raz sometimes calls them “logical” features.  See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 82, at 17, 25 . 
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part to a meta-ethics of obligation.  Raz puts the point in the following way.  He says that 
every legal system has “de facto” authority, 106 by which he means that it either claims to 
have authority (to provide us with exclusionary reasons), or is commonly believed to 
have such authority.107  But he distinguishes this from the question whether the law has 
“legitimate” authority, by which he means that the law really has the reason-giving force 
it claims for itself.108  In Raz’s work, like Kant’s, there are ultimately some connections 
between his meta-ethical views and his normative views, but the two views are—strictly 
speaking—separable.  Hence, one might absorb Raz’s work on exclusionary reasons, and 
view them as providing useful contributions to a meta-ethics of obligation, even if one 
were to disagree with him on more substantive normative matters.  
B. Capturing, rather than Excluding, Law’s Authority from the Second 
Personal Standpoint
As the last section suggested, Raz has been instrumental in clarifying ways 
in which the law purports to provide us with exclusionary reasons for action, and, hence, 
one important and previously underappreciated dimension of legal authority and legal 
obligation.  One might nevertheless accept that legal authority necessarily has some 
exclusionary force without following Raz to all of the conclusions he tries to draw from 
this fact.  As indicated above, the important Razean conclusion to examine for present 
purposes is the following: Raz believes that it is inconsistent with the nature of legal 
authority for the law to be identified by recourse to moral or evaluative criteria.109  This 
section discusses Raz’s grounds for believing there is such an inconsistency and then 
articulates an alternative account of exclusionary reasons that is informed by reflections 
on the second personal standpoint and would relieve the pressure towards thinking there 
is a genuine inconsistency.
So how exactly does Raz get from his work on legal authority to the idea 
that the law must be identifiable solely on the basis of social sources for the law to have 
its particular kind of authority?  Let us begin with some reconstruction.  Raz begins with 
the commonplace that we ordinarily have the basic capacity to engage in practical 
deliberation and to act on the reasons we perceive as applying to us.  When we do so, we 
engage our capacity to act as autonomous agents, in Raz’s view, and our use of this 
capacity helps us settle what we think we ought to do.110  We may, for example, 
106 JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 194,199 (1994) (“I will 
assume that necessarily law, every legal system which is in force everywhere has de facto  authority.”).
107 Id. (“That [the law has de facto authority] entails that the law either claims that it possesses legitimate 
authority or is held to possess it or both.”).
108 Id. at 194, 200 (“[I]n many cases the law’s claim to legitimate authority cannot be supported.  There are 
legal systems whose authority cannot be supported by the normal justification thesis or in any other way.”). 
109 RAZ, supra note 106, at 198-221.
110
  In the Introduction to Authority, Raz thus frames one of the central questions regarding authority as 
how we might square it with our personal autonomy.  Citing Robert Paul Wolff’s work as raising the 
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deliberate on the merits of various courses of action, and the process may result in the 
conclusion that we ought to return something that a friend has loaned us, given the moral 
reasons that apply to us.  We would then view ourselves as having a categorical reason 
that settles what we ought to do in those circumstances, one which overrides any self 
interested reasons to the contrary.
Raz accepts these commonplaces but believes that the law operates in 
ways that are importantly external to all of this, including our capacities for autonomous 
first personal deliberation.111 Clearly, however, the law purports to settle what we ought 
to do, and, hence—it would seem—to give us direction on the very same question that we 
commonly ask when engaging in autonomous first personal deliberation.112  If we assume
further, with Raz, that ordinary extra-legal reasons exhaust the ordinary reasons that 
apply to us in first personal deliberation, and that legal reasons nevertheless purport to 
exclude some of those reasons, then it is a short step to Raz’s conclusion that the normal 
or primary way that the law can do this legitimately is by providing us with guides to 
what we should do better than our own first personal deliberation would.  Raz calls this 
his “normal justification thesis,” and it plays a central role in his account of legitimate 
legal authority.113  A closely related thesis is his “dependence thesis,” which asserts that 
all authoritative directives (such as legal directives) should be based on the ordinary 
reasons (Raz sometimes calls these “dependent” reasons) that apply to the subjects of 
those directives and which bear on the circumstances covered by the directives.114  Notice
that both of these theses rely partly on Raz’s substantive normative views and not only on 
what I have called his meta-ethical reflections.
Together, these two theses also make up what Raz calls the “service 
conception” of legal authority, according to which the function of law is to mediate 
between persons and the dependent reasons that apply to them in first personal 
deliberation and absent the law.115  Raz explicitly connects this service conception up 
with his earlier work on exclusionary reasons, then, by asserting the “preemption thesis.”  
According to this thesis, the fact that an authority (such as a legal authority) requires 
performance of an action is a reason for its performance that is not to be added to all 
other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should replace some of them.116
We are still several steps away from Raz’s favored conclusions, but what we have here 
already is an account of both what I will call the normal function of law (i.e., to give us 
“challenge of philosophical anarchism,” Raz says: “And here lies the paradox.  In obeying the authority 
they abdicated their autonomy, says the philosophical anarchist, they abdicated their responsibility to 
decide on the balance of reasons themselves.”
111 See, e.g., id. at 11-19.
112 See RAZ, supra note 106, at 194, 196.
113 See Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, in AUTHORITY 129 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990).
114 Id. at 115, 125.   Raz complicates this definition in some ways that are not relevant to the argument 
here.  See RAZ, supra note 106, at 194, 214 n.13.
115 Raz, supra note 113, at 115, 131-32.  
116 Id. at 115, 124.
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practical guidance by identifying what we ought to do) and the normal mode of law (i.e., 
to give us this practical guidance by means of instructions that are both general and 
exclusionary in character).  
Now, Raz recognizes—as he must—that the law may not always serve the 
function that he ascribes to it well or even at all.  This just means that the law may not 
always have “legitimate” authority, in Raz’s terminology, even if it claims to have this 
authority or is commonly believed to have it.  (Presumably, whether the law actually has 
the authority it claims will depend on what precisely the law requires of us.)  Still, if the 
law is to function in what I have called its normal mode—i.e., if there is to be anything 
that we can understand as a specifically legal directive that requires an action of us 
regardless of what we would otherwise decide to do—then, on the present assumptions, it 
would seem that we must be able to identify what the law requires of us without engaging 
in the very same first personal deliberation that the law necessarily excludes.117 This is 
because—as Scott Shapiro has recently put it quite vividly—“Telling people that they 
should act on the rules that they should act on is not telling them anything!  Marks of 
authority are supposed to eliminate the problems associated with people distinguishing 
for themselves between legitimate and illegitimate norms.  However, a mark that can be 
identified only by resolving the very question that the mark is supposed to resolve is 
useless.”118
The relevant point can, in fact, be put in slightly different terms, which 
will further clarify Raz’s point.  Just as Raz recognizes that the law may not always serve 
the normal function he ascribes to it,119 he is aware that the law may not always function 
in what I have called its “normal mode.”  In Raz’s view, this would happen if legal 
officials were to employ a social convention that incorporated moral criteria to identify 
the law, one telling them in effect to identify what we ought to do by engaging in 
substantive moral reflection.  Judges using such a rule would be deciding what the law is 
on moral grounds.120  But—and this is the important point—the law would not be playing 
any independent role either in helping them determine what we ought to do or in 
providing anyone with any independent exclusionary guidance on that question.  Morality 
would have already done that on its own, as it were; and judges would merely be 
deciding legal disputes on the basis of what  we all know morality requires.  This—
according to Raz—should therefore be understood much more like cases where judges 
are called upon to apply the laws of a foreign nation.121  Applications like these in no way 
transform foreign laws into domestic laws, or make foreign obligations into obligations 
arising from domestic law. 122
117 See RAZ, supra note 106, at 194, 196-99.
118
  Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 149, 177 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001).  
119 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW  3-27 (1979)
120 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Incorporation by Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1, 10-12 (2005).
121 See id. at 10.  
122 See id.
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For there to be a distinctively legal (as opposed to moral) obligation in 
play, we must therefore be able to cash out how the law might provide us with a 
distinctive source of exclusionary practical guidance on what to do, in Raz’s view.123  We 
must be able to identify what the law independently requires of us, and not just decide 
legal questions based on what morality requires of us.  Raz infers from considerations 
like these that judges must employ an exclusive rule of recognition to identify the law: a 
rule that identifies the law’s requirements based wholly on social facts, and not on moral 
insight.124  Importantly, the class of social facts that might fit this bill is broad, and can in 
principle include everything from informal custom and precedent to explicit 
legislation.125  Still, if and when the law is identifiable not on these kinds of bases but 
rather on the basis of substantive moral criteria, Raz believes we can no longer make 
sense of the idea that there is a specifically legal obligation in play.  
Before assessing this line of argument, it is important to acknowledge 
Raz’s account for what it is.  It is a subtle and highly nuanced account of how the law 
could provide us with a distinct class of exclusionary reasons for action, one that takes 
seriously the desideratum that we be able to cash out how this exclusionary guidance 
operates in terms of concrete practical effects.  The sense in which law’s reasons are 
exclusionary is given practical teeth, in Raz’s account, through the suggestion that we can 
identify what the law requires of us based wholly on social sources, and without engaging 
in the very deliberation that the law’s requirements are meant to exclude.  The law can 
thereby settle what we ought to do and independently move us to act, where the ways that 
it is capable of moving us are comprehensible upon reflection.  Indeed, absent some other 
account of how the law’s exclusionary character shows up in our practical lives, or a 
rejection of law’s exclusionary character, I see no easy way to avoid Raz’s conclusions.
As the above sketches of Raz’s argument suggest, however, much of the 
pressure toward his particular conclusions arises from trying to account for law’s 
exclusionary character solely from the first person perspective of deliberation.  Darwall’s 
recent work on the second personal standpoint might therefore prove helpful at just this 
juncture.  This work clarifies, in particular, that there is another distinctive and 
irreducible practical standpoint that might be used to develop an alternative account of 
the law’s exclusionary character.  Taking a lead from Darwall, one might therefore try the 
following thought: 
(*) the law provides us with exclusionary reasons for action, which can have 
genuine and distinctive practical effects in our lives, insofar as the breach 
of a legal obligation—however identified—gives some other person or 
group the second-personal standing to raise a legal claim for non-
compliance.  
123 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 106, at 194, 196-99.
124 See id. at 195-219.
125 See JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 48 (1979).
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This idea should already have some basic intuitiveness to it, and it is in fact a legal 
analogue of what Darwall urges us to acknowledge about moral obligation—namely, that 
to understand moral obligation we must see it as giving some person or group the second 
personal standing to raise (moral) claims for non-compliance.126  This account of legal 
obligation would also place it within a familiar tradition in moral and political 
philosophy.  The basic idea already arises in embryonic form in Mill’s famous account of 
obligation, for example, where he says that “[w]e do not call anything wrong, unless we 
mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not 
by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his 
own conscience.”127  For reasons to be discussed in the next section, many of Hart’s 
relevant descriptions of the internal point of view also fit nicely within this tradition—
though this is a topic that will be returned to in the next section, where it can be discussed 
in greater detail.  These provide sufficient grounds at least to try out the idea.
An account of this kind would also relieve much of the pressure toward 
exclusive legal positivism.  This is because reference to the second personal standpoint 
reveals an important source of practical differences that the law can still make, even if the 
law incorporates moral criteria or must be interpreted in its best moral light.  To say that 
one ought (as a matter of law) to do what one ought (as a matter of morality) to do might 
say nothing of practical significance when the statement is assessed solely in terms of its 
implications for first personal deliberation.128 But the statement does appear to give rise 
to different second-personal implications.  The claim implies, in particular, that some 
person or group has the second-personal standing to raise not only a moral but also a 
legal claim for non-compliance.  In practice, this is thus a distinction that shows up not in 
our first personal thinking about how to act but rather in our second-personal thought 
about how to react to one another, and what reactions are either warranted or permissible.  
The practical difference that this makes in our lives would, moreover, appear to be of the 
right kind.  It is true, for example, that a judge employing an inclusive rule of recognition, 
or identifying the law in its best moral light, would be basing her legal conclusions at 
least partly on substantive moral or evaluative criteria.  Still, the fact that she believes 
that the law requires a specific action would be different her belief that morality requires 
that same action, and this difference would show up in the fact that she believes the legal 
obligation to give some person or group the second-personal standing to raise a 
specifically legal claim for non-compliance.  That is a distinct thought—on the present 
account—with distinct practical effects that are guided by the judge’s recognition of the 
obligation as a specifically legal obligation.  
126
 Stephen Darwall, Moral Obligation and Accountability, in THE SECOND PERSON STANDPOINT: 
MORALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (forthcoming 2006) (“That an action would cause severe harm . . . is a 
reason for someone not to do it, whether or not there is such a thing as a normative standing to demand that.  
But the action cannot violate a moral obligation unless such a standing exists, so the reason that derives 
from the moral obligation must be second-personal.”). 
127 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 193 (Bantam Books 1993) (1863).  It is particularly relevant that 
Mill, who is a consequentialist, would nevertheless agree on this basic feature of obligation.  See id.
128 Ultimately, I think even this contention may be too strong, for reasons discussed in Section IV, infra.
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Naturally, for an account like this to work, we must be able to distinguish 
between moral and legal claims.  I think we do make this distinction, however, at least 
intuitively.  We might also try to make it more precise.  In my view, for example, moral 
claims are expressive of a number of characteristically moral emotions like blame, 
resentment, guilt, shame, indignation, and the like, which give life to the charged settings 
in which we take one another to task for perceived wrongs, make excuses, point to 
justifications, seek reconciliation, and the like.129  When we bring moral complaints 
against one another and answer them, we hash things out under a shared standard of the 
right that we take ourselves each to be capable of accessing on our own, and the content 
of which is coordinated through processes of informal discussion and living in the kinds 
of small group settings that characterized our environment of evolutionary adaptation.130
Legal claims, by contrast, are raised to external authorities, and—in my view—engage 
attitudes of deference to such authorities for final binding adjudications of the disputes.131
Legal officials also employ a distinguishable standard to identify the content of the law, 
which we do not all take ourselves to have independent access to.  Often—though not 
always—legal claims also give external authorities, rather than private individuals, the 
standing to sanction relevant breaches.132  Importantly, however, this is only one view on 
how to make the distinction more precise, and nothing in this Article hinges on the 
validity of this particular attempt to provide clarification.  The main arguments presented 
here should thus survive ongoing debate on how to draw this particular distinction.
The foregoing discussion should have established that there is a way to 
make sense of how the law might show up in our practical lives as a distinctive 
phenomenon, which makes reference to the second-personal standpoint and, hence, 
would not require the law be identified solely on the basis of social sources like precedent 
and legislation.  The basic contours of the view should also be clear enough, and the view 
should have some preliminary motivation and prima facie intuitiveness behind it.  Still, it 
is one thing to make initial gestures like these, and quite another to argue for adoption of 
the view.  The next subsection will present six considerations that speak in favor of such 
an adoption.  
C. Six Grounds for Adopting the New Account
There are at least six important reasons to adopt an account of legal 
authority and legal obligation that allows the law to make practical differences in our 
129 See generally Kar, supra note 56.  
130 Id..
131 Id..
132
  There are some examples of so-called “primitive” legal systems that allow for organized adjudications 
but leave the sanctioning to private individuals and their kin or social cohorts.  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 291-92 (notes to page 94) (discussing adjudication without organized sanctions in the 
Nuer and early Roman law).  
September 2005] Hart and the Second Person 34
lives that show up not only in the first personal perspective of deliberation but also in the 
second personal standpoint—as elaborated in the last subsection.  
The first relevant consideration begins by accepting Raz’s maxim that we 
should seek an account of legal authority that captures the full sense in which the law 
purports to be non-optional.  The discussions thus far have suggested that there are at 
least three such senses: first, the law purports to give rise to standards for action that are 
general in application, irrespective of a person’s antecedent aims, desires or interests; 
second, the law purports to give rise to reasons for action that are independent a person’s 
antecedent aims, desires, or interests; and third, the law purports to give rise to reasons 
for action that exclude at least some class of other reasons for action.  But—as Stephen 
Darwall has observed in the related context of moral obligation—this cannot be enough 
to give rise to the sense that there is an obligation in play.133
Perhaps the easiest way to see this is by examining the rules of deductive 
logic.  Deductive logic contains a set of rules of inference that clearly meet the above 
three criteria: they have not just general but universal application, they give rise to 
reasons to revise various beliefs so as to render them consistent, and these reasons are 
overriding or have the standing to exclude any reasons we may have to want to maintain 
such inconsistencies despite the rules of logic.  This does not mean that we always follow 
the rules, of course, but this is presumably what we mean when we say that logic gives 
rise to requirements on our thought.  Still, nothing so far establishes that deductive logic 
gives rise to obligations, at least on its own, and it would seem to reflect an overly 
moralized sense of logic to claim anything to the contrary.  The difference between logic 
and morality—according to Darwall—is that in the case of logic we do not typically think 
the of the rules of inference as giving others the second personal standing to raise claims 
for non-compliance.134  We can, of course, correct each other for logical mistakes, and 
often do—but this is very different.  We can also sometimes acquire obligations to think 
logically or to render our beliefs logically consistent, which arise from things like 
professional obligations in the academy, or background maxims that govern ordinary 
conversation, or our participation in genuine moral or legal argumentation.  But deductive 
logic is not itself a set of obligations.  
If, moreover, reference to the second-personal standpoint is necessary to 
characterize the distinctive authority that legal obligations purport to have, then the 
account on offer here better captures essential features of legal authority than Raz’s 
current view.  As noted, one of the basic motivations for Raz’s move to exclusive legal 
positivism is that he believes it is the only view that can be rendered consistent with the 
full facts about legal authority.  Consistency of this kind is indeed very important.  But if 
further reflection on the facts suggests that legal authority must be understood in part by 
reference to the second personal standpoint, and if this fuller account of legal authority 
133 See, e.g., Darwall, supra note 5 (“What we are morally obligated to do is what we can warrantedly be 
held responsible for doing, what the moral community can and does demand that we do.”).
134
 As Darwall puts it: “But [categoricity] is only part of it, since there can be requirements on us that no 
one has any standing to require of us.  We are, for example, under a requirement of reason not to believe 
propositions that contradict the logical consequences of known premises.  But it is only in certain contexts, 
say, when you and I are trying to work out what to believe together, that we have any standing to demand 
that one another reason logically.”).  Id. at 3.
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and legal obligation is perfectly consistent with inclusive legal positivism, then Raz’s 
motivation should be redirected and turned away from his current preferred conclusions.  
The use of logic as an example is vivid, and is therefore particularly good 
for explanatory purposes.  It is important to recognize, however, that nothing in the 
argument so far depends on the fact that logic governs our theoretical reasoning about 
what third personal beliefs to maintain rather than our first personal practical reasoning 
about how to act.  As an initial matter, logic purports to govern both.135  Moreover, there 
are perhaps less vivid but equally valid examples of rules that govern action alone and 
that make the same point.  Consider, for example, the Western rules of etiquette 
governing which side of the plate to put the forks, and which side the knife.  If we accept 
these rules, we might think that “forks really must go on one the left, and knives on the 
right.”  We might also exhibit this acceptance by correcting others for mistakes or 
pointing them out.  Still, we need not think of the rules as giving anyone the standing to 
raise claims against one another for non-compliance.136  It is possible to think this way 
too, but it would seem to require a further thought on our part; and this further thought 
would seem to entail that we take the rules as giving rise to something more obligatory—
to obligations.  Perhaps we will think this further thought if—as in the example from the 
last section—we are in a situation where we have an obligation to a friend to act 
appropriately and respectfully in an important social situation, where everyone accepts 
these particular rules of etiquette, and takes them to express respect for the occasion.  
Absent second personal consequences like these, however, the rules are just rules.
A second and closely related consideration that favors the present account 
can be clarified with the aid of Don Regan’s helpful remarks in Authority and Value.137
In that Article, Regan reviews Raz’s views on legal authority as presented in Morality of 
Freedom, and shows that an important kind of rule, which he calls an “indicator rule,” 
can meet both Raz’s service conception of authority and Raz’s preemption thesis, thus 
showing itself capable of having the precise kind of authority that Raz attributes to the 
law.138 As Regan defines them, indicator rules are rules that derive their authority from 
their capacity to help produce intrinsically valuable states of affairs in the world, and that 
thus make unconditional demands on our moral attention.139  We can reasonably debate 
what, if anything, has this particular status, but whatever has this status is intrinsically 
worthy of pursuit.  In Regan’s words, indicator rules can thus help us “promote 
noncontingent, obligatory ends.”140  But Regan is careful to distinguish this fact from the 
135 See, e.g., Gärdenfors & Sahlin, supra note 49, at 1, 6.
136 See, e.g., STEPHEN DARWALL, Moral Obligation and Accountability, in THE SECOND PERSON 
STANDPOINT: MORALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (forthcoming 2006) (discussiong Phillipa Foot’s 
comparisons between morality and etiquette) (“The point is that accountability is no part of the concept of 
etiquette in the way it is of moral obligation.”).  
137
  62 S. CAL L. REV 995 (1988-89).
138 Id. at 1003.
139 See id. at 1005.
140 Id.
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thought that the rules give rise to obligations in the full sense that we commonly think of 
in relation to law and morality.  This is because the rules are merely fallible guides to 
non-contingent ends.  As Regan puts the point quite nicely, indicator rules are thus 
“something more substantial than a rule of thumb, but less substantial than a rule 
simpliciter (even after we take into account that most rules simpliciter impose only prima 
facie obligations).”141  Here is one of Regan’s examples:
Let us assume for purposes of argument (what I take to be true) that sex 
between unmarried persons is not invariably immoral, but that it is to be 
avoided if either party’s participation is not fully voluntary.  Under these 
circumstances, an excellent indicator rule for a university faculty member 
is not to have sexual relations with any of his (or her) students. . . .  This 
indicator-rule is not infallible.  It is not impossible that a student should 
have sex fully voluntarily with her (or his) professor, and so the indicator-
rule in question might lead one to avoid a non-harmful, perhaps even a 
genuinely valuable, relationship.  But it is is very unlikely that the 
student’s participation is fully voluntary, even if the professor does 
nothing that could possibly be thought of as actively coercive.  So, “Never 
have sex with your students” is a good, albeit fallible, indicator-rule.142
But if indicator-rules like these fit Raz’s account of legal authority, then—
as Regan points out—Raz’s account of legal authority does not capture the full sense of 
authority that legal obligations purport to have.  Indicator rules are in fact less obligatory 
than Raz perceives the law to be, and Regan acknowledges this fact by saying that Raz 
“wants obligations to be a bit more substantial, friendship to be a bit ‘thicker,’ and 
commitments to particular projects to be a bit more existentially significant than they 
really are.”143  But Regan himself thinks we should reject this further sense of 
obligatoriness because Regan himself is a sophisticated consequentialist, who recognizes 
that this further sense cannot be fully squared with a fundamentally consequentialist 
theory of value.  Regan think that Raz’s basic account of legal authority is nevertheless 
correct, and so he pins a form of consequentialism on Raz, “perhaps to some extent 
malgré lui”—or despite himself—as Regan nicely puts it.144
I have said that Regan is a “sophisticated consequentialist.” By this, I 
mean to distinguish him from consequentialists who assume that preference satisfaction 
(of some kind) is the sole goal worthy of pursuit and do not accept the value of further 
reflection on this question.145  As indicated earlier, the thought that preference 
141 Id. at 1004.
142 Id. at 1005.
143 Id. at 999.
144 Id. at 997.
145 See, e.g., id. at 998 (agreeing with the need to reject certain views “common among consequentialists 
concerning what has intrinsic value or what we should promote,” which include the views that (i) pleasure 
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satisfaction is valuable springs readily to mind, but Regan thinks that knowing what is 
intrinsically valuable can be much harder than this and deserves further reflection.146  It 
would thus be possible to learn, in the process, that many other things are intrinsically 
valuable, such as friendship, self-respect, dignity, or perhaps human happiness, which, as 
Mill defines it, is “not a life of rapture, but moments of such, in an existence made up of 
few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the 
active over the passive, and having as a foundation of the whole, not to expect more from 
life than it is capable of bestowing.”147  Still, acceptance of a fundamentally 
consequentialist view would have two distinct effects.  First, it would mean that legal or 
moral rules like “Never have sex with your students” should be deemed fallible, and, 
hence, should allow for exceptions in some cases where it is clear that none of the 
purposes behind the rule are being served.  I have no interest in challenging this part of 
Regan’s views.  Second, it would mean that even in cases where the purposes behind 
various legal and moral rules are being served by giving rise to obligations to specific 
people, the perceived agent-centered force of these obligations would be illusory in the 
final analysis.  Hence, specific persons should always lack standing to bring successful 
claims for non-compliance if the person who has breached the purported obligation has 
done so to cause two or more others to fulfill their obligations in equally weighty 
circumstances.  I will be concerned to challenge this second consequence here.
This second consequence would, indeed, make moral and legal obligations 
out to be less obligatory than we commonly take them to be.  An account of obligation 
that makes reference to second-personal standing to raise claims for non-compliance 
would, on the other hand, bridge this particular gap.  Though this point can in principle 
cut both ways, considerations like these provide a second reason to think that Raz’s 
account of legal authority cannot fully capture the distinctive normative force that we 
commonly take legal obligations to have.  Hence, if Raz is to resist being dubbed a 
consequentialist about legal authority—even, perhaps, to some extent malgré lui—Raz 
may need the account on offer here to ground his resistance.
A third set of considerations that speak in favor of the present account 
arises from reflection on a number of commonplaces about our uses of moral and legal 
language.  These commonplaces rest on a distinction that philosophers are now quite 
familiar with: the distinction between expressing various psychological attitudes (such as 
beliefs) in language, and using language to say that one is in the relevant state of mind.  
In Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, for example, Hart says that 
“[p]hilosophers are no doubt now quite familiar with these distinctions which enable 
them for any proposition ‘p’, not mentioning the speaker’s belief, to explain the oddity of 
is the sole such good, that (ii) we should promote the satisfaction of desires as such, and that (iii) that even 
“informed desires” or “rationally criticized desires” can capture what has intrinsic value.).
146 See id. at 998 (describing as “a very difficult project which has received to little attention” “the project 
of identifying what we really think is good, once we agree it is not pleasure or the satisfaction of desire”) 
(“Once we try to say just what is valuable in friendship, or just what should be our attitude and behavior to 
great art, or just how it is that certain actions have intrinsic value or disvalue, we find that these questions 
are much more difficult than they may have appeared.”).
147 MILL, supra note 127, at 193.  
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saying ‘p but I do not believe that p’ without maintaining that we have here a 
contradiction or that p means or entails that I believe p.”148  Hart uses distinctions like 
these to motivate his own rejection of Bentham’s command theory of law.149  If, 
however, we have correctly identified various structural or meta-ethical features of legal 
authority and legal obligation, then we might expect to find them reflected in similar 
oddities in our moral and legal language.  
We do in fact see such phenomena, at least in relation to the account 
proposed here.  For example, it would sound odd to address someone second-personally 
and say, “What you did to me was wrong, and I don’t blame you for doing it.”  It is hard 
to know what exactly one might mean with such an expression.  Similarly, it would be 
hard to understand what someone might mean if he were to say, “What you did to my 
friend was wrong, and he has no right to be upset with you or blame you for it.”  We 
could, on the other hand, easily explain these facts if—as Darwall has suggested—blame 
is an implicitly second personal response to moral wrong, and if our moral language were 
in part expressive of attitudes that have an intrinsic tie to such second personal reactions 
and their perceived warrant.150  The pattern of explanation is one that could, moreover, be 
extended to similar phenomena in the law.  For example, we would not quite know what 
to do with a judge’s pronouncement that ended a bench trial or a written opinion with: 
“The defendant therefore has a legal obligation to compensate the plaintiff, and I hold for 
the defendant.”  
By contrast, some of the purportedly logical features of Raz’s narrowly 
first personal account of legal authority lack this particular quality.  There is, for 
example, nothing obviously odd about a judge saying something like: “The modern law 
of contracts does not allow for the legal enforcement of all promises, but where—as 
here—the defendant’s promise was also supported by consideration, the defendant had a 
legal obligation to follow through with the clear demands of conscience.”  This is a case 
where both judge and citizen may be identifying what the law requires in part by drawing 
on substantive moral insight, but where the statement appears perfectly informative.  This 
manner of identifying legal obligations, when explicitly recognized, seems perfectly 
compatible with thinking that there is still a distinctive legal obligation in play.  
Let me expand on this last example to clarify a fourth consideration 
favoring an account that makes reference to the second personal standpoint to cash out
some of the practical effects of legal obligations.  Contract law is an instructive case 
because it is an area of the law that is commonly thought to incorporate moral 
requirements, while narrowing them to allow for the legal enforcement of only some 
promises that might otherwise be morally binding.  One might dispute whether this 
reference to moral criteria is ineliminable, and try to argue that there are now social facts 
that allow legal officials to know that there is a legal obligation to follow through with 
certain promises or pay compensation.  But this would seem to miss a critical practical 
point of the law of contracts.  By allowing individuals the standing to enforce certain 
148
  H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in AUTHORITY 97 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990).
149 See id. at 93-102.
150 See STEPHEN DARWALL, Moral Obligation and Accountability, in THE SECOND PERSON STANDPOINT: 
MORALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (forthcoming 2006).
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forms of promissory exchange in courts of law, the modern law of contracts helps create 
the conditions of trust needed for non-simultaneous exchanges between relative strangers.  
This greatly expands the boundaries of our cooperation, and allows for the rise of markets 
as vehicles to human welfare.  This is not, moreover, an ancillary practical consequence 
of contract law, which takes a back seat to the role that social facts now play in helping 
us recognize that we have a duty to keep our promises.  This is the more important 
practical consequence of contract law.  Indeed, the second personal standing to raise legal 
complaints for non-compliance in circumstances of exchange may be of such practical 
importance that—as some authors have suggested—its existence is what principally 
distinguishes first world from developing nations and explains the varying degrees of 
economic success that they have been able to achieve.  According to Nobel Laureate 
Douglas C. North, for example, “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost 
enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.”151
This last example has, moreover, been chosen very carefully for a related 
reason.  As Raz has rightly notes`, we should not be too quick to assume that every time a 
legal official decides a case by applying a given standard, the official is thereby 
incorporating that standard into the law.  Raz urges that we have at least an intuitive idea 
of the distinction between genuine incorporation and applying non-legal standards.  Still, 
contract law is in no way a tangential phenomenon, comparable to instances where courts 
might be called upon in isolated instances to decide cases in accordance with some 
foreign set of laws.  Contract law instead is a central feature of the law of many nations, 
and it seems on its face to incorporate, at least in part, a moral norm the content of which 
we all have ready access to.  And while it would be plausible, when employing Raz’s 
distinction, to think that the specific obligations that arise from a particular contract are 
not literally parts of the law, it is much less plausible, under that same standard, to think 
that the basic obligation to keep our contracts is not a genuine legal obligation.  This is a 
legal obligation the content of which we often identify in part on the basis of moral 
criteria.  Given that important and central areas of the law have this particular quality to 
them, an account of the law would—all other things equal—be more satisfying if it were 
to illuminate how these areas of the law might give rise to genuine legal obligations.  
Fifth, it is important to recognize that reference to the second personal 
standpoint is an implicit feature of legal adjudication.  When a judge decides a case, one 
part of her decision will involve determining whether a legal standard has been breached 
and whether that breach warrants some kind of legal response.  But if a judge decides 
these questions in the affirmative and renders a verdict, this is not all the judge is doing.  
This is because a judge can only hold for a particular party who has brought a suit if the 
party in addition has the standing to raise the claim.  Indeed, this standing requirement is 
151 INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).  Some more recent 
authors have questioned whether formal legal enforcement mechanisms are really necessary for this kind of 
development, but these authors tend to argue that there are informal substitutes that can do the same work 
in particular social contexts, thus effectively assuming the same basic point about the need for conditions of 
trust to underwrite exchanges among strangers.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The 
Political Economy of Rule of Law Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 99, 108 (2004);
Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 89, 92-94 (2003).
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so fundamental that—as William Fletcher has noted—it is read into the Constitution even 
though the Constitution has no explicit language stating the requirement.152  Moreover, 
“standing is a preliminary jurisdictional requirement, formulated at a high level of 
generality and applied across the entire domain of law.”153  What this means is that courts 
only have the power to decide and render judgments concerning the violations of legal 
standards in cases where the party bringing the claim has the second-personal (legal) 
standing to do so.  Moreover, while one might try to argue that these facts are merely 
local facts about domestic law, there would seem to be a rather fundamental difference 
between the adjudication of disputes under the law and abstract statements about the law 
or orders that certain actions be taken made by political institutions.  Only the former 
would seem to be specifically legal decisions—as opposed to advisory opinions or 
executive orders.
If no court has the authority to adjudicate a claim that someone has 
breached a purported obligation, then it would seem to make little sense to say that there 
is anything we might recognize as a legal obligation still in play.  Hence, even run-of-the-
mill, ordinary adjudications implicitly show that reference to the second-personal 
standpoint and standing to raise claims is an implicit feature of legal obligation.
Finally, sixth, it is worth remembering that Raz’s account of de facto legal 
authority is influenced in part by his substantive normative views, including his belief 
that the law obtains what authority it has from morality.  For reasons discussed above, it 
is this belief that, in part, pushes Raz to the conclusion that the law must give us 
independent source-based guidance on the very same question to which morality speaks 
if the law is to have legitimate authority.  This conception of legitimate legal authority is, 
however, a form of moral foundationalism: it seeks to ground legal authority in, or derive 
it from, morality.  This conception thus reflects commitment to a substantive, normative 
view in political theory, which goes well beyond any claims about the meta-ethics of 
legal obligation.  It is also a normative view that is separable, at least in principle, from 
positivism.  An alternative would be to join John Rawls and seek instead to understand 
what legal obligations we legitimately have by engaging in what he calls “wide reflective 
equilibrium.”154  Gilbert Harman has, in fact, recently identified the rejection of what he 
152 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222-23 (1988).  Fletcher has 
argued that some of the standing requirements (such as “injury in fact”, “causation in fact” and 
“redressability”) that are read into the Constitution should be eliminated, thus giving Congress the 
unlimited power to decide who has standing to raise a claim, but the fact remains that Congress does not 
have this right and highly intuitive features of second-personal standing remain a deep and pervasive part 
of the law.  
153 Id. at 223.
154 Norman Daniels has provided a lucid definition of “wide reflective equilibrium” as follows:
The method of wide reflective equilibrium is an attempt to produce coherence in an 
ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by particular persons, namely (a) a set of considered 
moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background 
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calls “special foundationalism”—which would include Raz’s form of moral 
foundationalism—as one of the “three good trends in moral and political philosophy over 
the last fifty years.”155  Harman thinks that the process of reflective equilibrium is a surer 
route to knowledge about when common sense moral rules and legal requirements might 
have the specific authority they claim.156
Clearly, this is not the place to try to enter into these complex substantive 
and methodological debates.  The relevant point here is just that Raz’s substantive 
normative position helps motivate, and is in turn partly motivated by, his particular 
account of how exclusionary reasons function in first personal practical deliberation to 
give rise to requirements on action.  The views are mutually supporting and make up part 
of an internally coherent and interdependent set of views about de facto and legitimate 
legal authority.  For those of us who would question Raz’s commitment to moral 
foundationalism, however, there is one less motivation to accept his particular account of 
how exclusionary reasons provide us with practical guidance, and some reason to 
abandon it.  The existence of the alternative account on offer here can, in fact, help pave 
the way for a number of non-foundationalist accounts of legitimate legal authority, which 
may be in better keeping with contemporary insights on normative methodology.
III. HART AND A RENEWED DIRECTION FOR LEGAL POSITIVISM
The preceding section presented a number of philosophical reasons to 
resist the claim that Raz’s important and influential work on legal authority necessitates a 
move to exclusive legal positivism.  The section also outlined a distinctive way of 
capturing the most important aspects of Raz’s work, by extending some of Darwall’s 
recent thought on the second personal standpoint to produce a richer account of legal 
obligation.  I have argued that this alternative better—and perhaps uniquely—captures 
the full facts about legal authority, and helps illuminate the full range of ways in which 
the law can show up in our practical lives by providing us both with guides to action and
grounds for specific kinds of critical reactions to normative deviations.  Arguments like 
these would surely help someone like Hart absorb Raz’s contributions without having to 
follow Raz to his exclusive legal positivist conclusions.  There is, however, still a 
separate question as to how best to interpret Hart, and whether the position developed 
here represents the best elaboration of his basic views and core jurisprudential 
commitments.  This question is partly exegetical, but partly also philosophical—at least 
in this particular case. I say this because, for reasons to be discussed, an answer will 
require resolving various tensions in Hart’s thought and writing in ways that best capture 
his most fundamental positivist commitments.  
This section begins by discussing some of the relevant tensions in Hart’s 
work.  There is a well known inconsistency, which is commonly attributed to Hart, and 
Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76:5 J. OF PHIL.  256, 258-
59 (1979).  This same process can—and has in the case of Rawls—led to independent inquiry into what our 
genuine political obligations are.  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
155
  Gilbert Harman, Three Trends in Moral Philosophy, 37 VALUE INQUIRY 415 (2003).
156 Id.
September 2005] Hart and the Second Person 42
which would challenge the coherence of his version of inclusive legal positivism.  The 
first subsection describes that purported inconsistency, but argues that it only arises if 
Hart is interpreted as insisting that the law must be capable of making a practical 
difference in our lives in ways that are narrowly first personal.  Once this fact has been 
recognized, a close look at Hart’s text suggests that there was an even deeper and 
underappreciated tension in Hart’s thought on just this issue.  As discussed below, 
although Hart sometimes used language suggesting commitment to this narrow version of 
the practical difference thesis, Hart also exhibited an implicit understanding of the need 
to refer to something like the second personal standpoint to produce a satisfying account 
of legal obligation throughout his career.  This understanding even developed to the point 
of near explicitness by the time Hart ended this career.  What Hart lacked was the 
vocabulary to fully articulate this understanding, which fact made him feel constrained to 
describe his absorption of Raz’s insights in ways that are—strictly speaking—
inconsistent with other parts of his views.  It is my belief Hart had some understanding of 
these issues, however inchoate and undeveloped, and that this fact—rather than any 
failure to understand Raz’s work or its supposed implications for positivism—ultimately 
explains his resistance to exclusive legal positivism.  
Regardless of whether these last claims are true, however, the second 
subsection argues that the account on offer here better captures and harmonizes Hart’s 
core jurisprudential commitments.  If this is right, then any vestigial tensions in Hart’s 
mature views should be resolved in favor of the present account.  Hart would (or at least 
should) have welcomed the present account as an appropriate development of his own, 
and as the right basic framework from within which to further develop and refine legal 
positivist theory.  He would have recognized it as the right basic framework from within 
which to understand the law, including the relevant grounds for choosing between 
positivist and non-positivist accounts of the law.  
A. Locating the Deeper Tensions in Hart’s Views
This subsection aims to clarify some of the relevant tensions in Hart’s 
views.  As indicated above, Hart remained relatively silent during many of the early 
debates between inclusive and exclusive legal positivists.  In his posthumously published 
Postscript to The Concept of Law, however, Hart explicitly endorsed an incorporationist 
version of positivism, according to which officials identify the law by means of a rule of 
recognition that can in principle incorporate moral criteria.157 The received view has it 
that this endorsement—which was in fact implicit in his work even as early as The 
Concept of Law—created an important tension in Hart’s views.  Jules Coleman, for 
example, is the predominant living inclusive legal positivist and is charitable to Hart’s 
views.  Coleman nevertheless acknowledges that there is at least an apparent 
inconsistency, and Coleman’s discussion will thus be useful in locating the problem.  
The relevant tension arises from the fact that Hart, as commonly 
interpreted, held three inconsistent theses.  As Coleman has observed, there is 
“overwhelming textual and philosophical support for the view that, in addition to 
157 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 250-54 (2d ed. 1994) (1961).
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Incorporationism, Hart accepts . . . the Conventionality and the Practical Difference 
Theses.”158 Coleman defines the Conventionality Thesis, roughly, as “the claim that law 
is made possible by an interdependent convergence of behavior and attitude: what we 
might think of as an ‘agreement’ among individuals expressed in a social convention or 
rule.”159 Coleman then parses the Practical Difference Thesis as “the claim that, in order 
to be law, authoritative pronouncements must in principle be capable of making a 
practical difference: a difference, that is, in the structure or content of deliberation or 
action.”160
But, as Coleman has observed, the Practical Difference Thesis—so 
construed—cannot be held in combination with both Incorporationism and the 
Conventionality Thesis.  Earlier sections have already clarified one important reason why 
this is so: it would be difficult, if not impossible, to account for how the law might 
provide us with exclusionary practical guidance if these effects were to have to be cashed 
out in wholly first personal terms and if one were to permit the legal rule of recognition 
to incorporate moral criteria.  This was Raz’s basic point, and while one might in 
principle try to resist this move by rejecting Raz’s contributions to our understanding of 
legal authority, Hart importantly—and rightly, in my view—did not do this.  By the end 
of his career, Hart instead explicitly acknowledged that reference to something like 
exclusionary reasons (he called them ‘peremptory reasons’) was needed to fully capture 
the specific kind of authority that the law purports to have in our lives, and he began to 
build such reference into his account of the internal point of view in relation to legal 
obligations.161 Hence, if it is appropriate to attribute to Hart the Practical Difference 
Thesis—as so far construed—then Hart would indeed seem to hold an inconsistent trio of 
beliefs.  This is in part162 why Coleman has said that “[w]hereas I believe that Hart is 
more likely to have abandoned Incorporationism, thus bringing his position considerably 
closer to Raz’s in crucial respects, I propose that we abandon or at least significantly 
modify the place of the Practical Difference Thesis within positivism.”163
The last section should have also clarified, however, that there are at least 
two ways to cash out a relevant Practical Difference Thesis.  According to the first—
which Coleman and the exclusive legal positivists have thus far attributed to Hart—
authoritative legal pronouncements must be capable of making practical differences in 
our lives that show up in the structure or content of first personal deliberation or action.
158
  Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HART’S 
POSTSCRIPT 99, 101 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Reasons, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 
243-68 (2002).
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   I say “in part” because Scott Shapiro has articulated a distinctive set of arguments that have also 
influenced Coleman, and have raised the specter of an inconsistency from another angle.  Shapiro’s 
arguments will be addressed in detail in Section IV, infra.  
163 Coleman, supra note 158, at 99, 101.  
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According to the second—which is under development here—the relevant practical 
differences might show up either from this first personal perspective or in permissions or 
warrants for specifically legal, second personal reactions to deviations, which can include 
things like legal demands for compliance, complaints, claims, prosecutions, and the like.  
Although the first version of the Practical Difference thesis might create an inconsistency 
in Hart’s views, the second would not—or at least not for any of the reasons Raz has 
pointed out.  Which version should we fairly attribute to Hart?  
This last question cannot, in my view, be answered solely on the basis of 
exegesis.  Hart lacked access to contemporary work on the second personal standpoint, 
and was therefore unable to frame the issue explicitly enough to prompt a conscious and 
articulate decision that might show up in his text.  Still, as the rest of this subsection 
seeks to establish, a careful look at Hart’s writings will prove useful for two preliminary 
reasons.  First, it will suggest that while there were indeed competing currents in Hart’s 
views, one important and underappreciated tension involved this very issue.  This more
basic tension must, moreover, be resolved before any of the more familiar inconsistencies 
can be fairly attributed to Hart.  Second, the textual evidence suggests that Hart was 
aware, and became increasingly aware, of the need to make the kind of distinction under 
discussion here.  An examination of this textual evidence will therefore set the stage for a 
more probing look at which version of the Practical Difference Thesis better captures 
Hart’s core views, and better harmonizes his deepest jurisprudential commitments.  That 
discussion will take place only in the next subsection.  
Let us begin, then, with the first prong of what I have called the 
“underappreciated” tension in Hart’s work.  On the one hand, Hart not only claimed to 
accept many of Raz’s insights about legal authority and exclusionary reasons toward the 
end of his career; Hart also used terms to describe how peremptory reasons function that 
are strikingly close to Raz’s.  At one point, Hart says, for example, that when one gives a 
peremptory command, one:
characteristically intends his hearer to take the commander’s will instead of his 
own as a guide to action and so to take it in place of any deliberation or reasoning 
of his own: the expression of the commander’s will that an act be done is 
intended to preclude or cut off any independent deliberation by the hearer of the 
merits pro and con of doing the act.  The commander’s expression of will 
therefore is not intended to function within the hearer’s deliberations as a reason 
for doing the act, not even as the strongest or dominant reason, for that would 
presuppose that independent deliberation was to go on, whereas the commander 
intends to cut off or exclude it.  This I think is precisely what is meant by 
speaking of a command as ‘requiring’ action and calling a command a 
‘peremptory’ form of address.  Indeed the word ‘peremptory’ in fact just means 
cutting of deliberation, debate, or argument . . . .”164
On one highly plausible reading of this passage, Hart is adopting Raz’s account of how 
exclusionary reasons function in first personal deliberation to make sense of the idea that 
there is a requirement in play with concrete practical effects.  
164 Hart, supra note 161, at 243, 253.  
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It should be noted that language like this is in no way persistent or 
pervasive in Hart’s work.  Still, it does appear explicitly, at least late in his career.  For 
reasons already discussed, there is also great pressure to understand exclusionary reasons 
in roughly this way if one aims to understand them wholly from within the first personal 
standpoint, and if one takes seriously the desideratum that this exclusionary force must be 
accounted for as capable of having real practical effects in our lives.  Hart’s adoption of 
Raz’s language is thus—to my mind—wholly understandable, at least in the absence of a
clearly defined alternative.  
On the other hand, there is a competing strand in Hart’s writing, which 
appears to reflect a more consistent commitment to a version of the Practical Difference 
Thesis that references second personal phenomena.  Consider, for example, the kinds of 
passages on the basis of which exclusive legal positivists typically attribute the Practical 
Difference Thesis to Hart.  When Scott Shapiro makes the attribution, he says that “the 
only function that all law can be said to satisfy, according to Hart, is that it seeks to guide 
human conduct.”165  Shapiro’s support for this proposition is the following remark by 
Hart in his Postscript: “I think it quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which law 
serves as such beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of 
such conduct.”166  But once we have a clearer understanding of how the second personal 
standpoint is distinct, we can see that this passage actually makes dual reference both to 
guides to action and grounds for reaction. Indeed, Hart consistently describes the internal 
point of view with language that makes such dual reference throughout his career.167
And while Hart did not yet have the vocabulary to ask whether this second element 
should be framed in terms of specifically second personal standing to raise claims, Hart’s 
repeated use of the conjunction does suggest something very important for present 
purposes.  It suggests that Hart thought these two elements were distinguishable and did 
independent work in his account of the law.  The second element is, moreover, one that 
directly guides criticisms of conduct, not conduct.  
Not all such reaction is, of course, second personal.  As earlier discussions 
have noted, we sometimes use normative language merely to call attention to the fact that 
a particular case meets or fails to meet a given standard, as, for example, when we point 
out a logical or mathematical error in circumstances where no one has an obligation to 
get things right.  It seems to me that Hart did not always adequately distinguish such uses 
from our more robust uses of normative language involving obligations when he wrote 
The Concept of Law.  For example, while Hart took great pains to distinguish his account 
of obligation from earlier predictive accounts, he sometimes tried to clarify the 
distinction with words like the following:  
165
  Scott Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 149, 170 (2001).  
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., HART, supra note 157, at 57, 84, 85, 90; Hart, supra note 161, at 243, 257; H.L.A. Hart, Legal 
Duty and Obligation, IN H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 127, 154.  There are occasional times where 
Hart says only that the internal point of view is merely that of “a member of the group which accepts and 
uses [the rules] as guides to conduct.”  THE CONCEPT OF LAW at 89.  He does so, however, only in contexts 
where he makes dual reference to guides to conduct and grounds for criticizing deviations in a number of 
other places.  See id. at 84, 85, 90.
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While the difference may seem slight between the analysis of a statement of 
obligation as a prediction or assessment of the chances of hostile reactions, and 
our own contention that though this statement presupposes a background in 
which deviations from rules are generally met by hostile reactions, yet its 
characteristic use is not to predict this but to say that a person’s case falls under 
such a rule.168
Statements like this do not, however, fully capture the distinction between asserting that 
there has been a deviation from a standard and either saying that there has been a breach 
of an obligation or raising a claim against someone for failure to fulfill an obligation.  
The passage does refer to “hostile reactions,” which adds an important dimension to the 
account.  But this reference—standing alone—is not quite enough to attribute to Hart an 
incipient understanding of the importance of referring to the second personal standpoint.  
This is because Hart neither indicates in this passage that obligation statements imply that 
such reactions are warranted nor spells out that they should be understood in terms of any 
second-personal phenomena like claims or demands. 
Still, other passages of The Concept of Law suggest that Hart was at least 
incipiently aware that he needed to make something like these further distinctions even at 
that point.  As an initial matter, Hart explicitly raises the fact that he needs to say 
something to distinguish rules from obligations early in the book.169 In trying to clarify 
the distinction, he also uses a number of phrases that are much more in line with the 
account being developed here.  He says at one point, for example, that “[r]ules are 
conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations when the general demand of conformity 
is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to 
deviate is great.”170  This statement now makes explicit reference to demands for 
conformity, which are implicitly second-personal responses to conduct.  The passage also 
suggests that Hart’s uses of terms like “serious social pressure” should be understood as 
reflected in things like demands of this kind.  In my view, a fair reading of Hart’s overall 
text suggests that, at this stage, Hart may have placed more emphasis on trying to account 
for the relevant distinction in terms of a number of things like the seriousness of the 
social pressure,171 its physicality,172 its hostility173 and a number of other similar 
168 HART, supra note 157, at 86.
169 See id. at 82-91.
170 Id. at 86.  Hart also adds to two other features to his account of obligation, which will not be of direct 
relevance here but should be noted.  The first is, in my view, a general feature of obligation: “It is generally 
recognized that the conduct required by these rules may, while helping others, conflict with what the person 
who owed the duty may wish.”  Id. at 87.  The second may be better construed as pervasive feature of 
moral and legal obligation, and perhaps some other kinds of obligations that have similar centrality in 
social life, but not necessarily all kinds of obligation.  In particular, Hart says: “The rules supported by this 
serious social pressure are thought important because they are believed to be necessarily to the maintenance 
of social life or some highly prized feature of it.”  Id.  
171 Id. at 86. (“What is important is that the insistence on importance or seriousness of social pressure 
behind the rules is the primary factor determining whether they are thought of as giving rise to 
obligations.”).  
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characteristics.  These are best understood as a series of false starts, which could not 
ultimately support the weight Hart tried to place on them.  Still, the passages suggest that 
Hart was aware both that his account of obligation needed to make dual reference to 
guides to action and grounds for reaction; and that he recognized that he needed to 
distinguish obligations from rules in part in terms of the types of reactions that were 
warranted for deviations.  Hart also sometimes explicitly described the relevant type of 
reactions in terms of inherently second personal phenomena.  
By the time Hart absorbed Raz’s work, however, his accounts of legal 
obligation underwent a subtle transformation, and he began to build very consistent and 
explicit references to second personal phenomena into the account.  For example, in 
Legal Duty and Legal Obligation, Hart says the following:
To say that a man has a legal obligation to do a certain act is not, though it may 
imply, a statement about the law or a statement that a law exists requiring him to 
behave in a certain way.  It is rather to assess his acting or not acting in that way 
from the point of view adopted by at least the Courts of the legal system who 
accept the law as a standard for the guidance and evaluation, of conduct, 
determining what is permissible by way of demands and pressure for 
conformity.174
Similarly, when he describes various features of his mature views on legal authority, Hart 
says that when one accepts certain directives as authoritative,
[the] words maybe taken not only as [i] a peremptory guide to action by those 
who are themselves commanded to act but also as [ii-a] a standard of evaluation 
of the conduct of others as correct or incorrect right or wrong (though not 
necessarily morally right or wrong) and as [ii-b] rendering unobjectionable and 
permissible what would normally be resented, that is demands for conformity, or 
various coercive pressure on others to conform, whether or not those others 
themselves recognize the commands as peremptory reasons for their own 
actions.”175
This move from [ii-a] to [ii-b] distinguishes obligations from rules much more clearly;
and it does so by making reference to phenomena that are fundamentally second personal.
The passage even intimates that the notion of ‘peremptory reason’ that is in play is one 
that might be reflected in a judge’s view that certain persons have standing to raise claims 
for non-compliance even if the person against whom the claim has been raised does not
view the standard as playing any role at all in his or her first personal deliberation.  
172 Id. (“[W]hen physical sanctions are prominent or usual among the forms of pressure, even though these 
are neither closely defined nor administered by officials but are left to the community at large, we shall be 
inclined to classify the rules as primitive or rudimentary form of law.”).
173 Id. (Statements of obligation “presuppose[] a background in which deviations from rules are generally 
met by hostile reactions . . . .”).
174 Hart, Legal Duty and Obligation, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 126, 154.  
175 Hart, supra note 161 , at 243, 257.  
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Indeed, by the end of his career, Hart’s account of obligation consistently 
has this quality to it.  I will mention only two other passages to make this point.  First, 
when Hart extends his account of obligation to the duties or obligations that he thinks 
judges have to follow the law by adjudicating disputes under the rule of recognition, Hart
cashes this thought out by saying the following:
not to follow [this settled practice] would be regarded as a breach of duty one not  
only warranting criticism but counter-action where possible by correction in a 
higher court on appeal.  It is also acknowledged that demands for compliance
would be regarded as proper and are to be met as a matter of course.176
Second, at the end of Legal Obligation and Legal Duty, Hart contrasts his own view of 
obligation with Raz’s.  He make the contrast as follows:  
Far better adapted to the legal case is a different, non-cognitive theory of duty 
according to which committed statements asserting that others have a duty do not 
refer to actions which they have categorical reasons to do but, as the etymology 
of ‘duty’ and indeed ‘ought’ suggests, such statements refer to actions which are 
due from or owed by the subjects having the duty,  in the sense that they may be 
properly demanded or exacted from them.”177
This last phrase is thoroughly second-personal and helps clarify that the references to 
social pressures that sometimes still arise in Hart’s final account of legal obligation are 
best understood as public versions of second personal address—whereby society or the 
state (rather than individuals) exact things from citizens under the law.  
Hart’s text thus shows a growing tendency to refer to phenomena that are 
second-personal as an integral part of his account of legal obligation, and a growing 
awareness that references of this kind were needed to capture the distinctive qualities of 
legal obligations.  There are, however, also a few swatches of text that appear late in his 
career, which appear to describe how peremptory reasons function in wholly first 
personal terms.  These tendencies are in tension with one another, but the familiar view 
that Hart cannot consistently maintain commitment to incorporationism, the practical 
difference thesis and the conventionality thesis at once will only be true if we harmonize 
Hart’s texts by accepting these latter descriptions rather than the other important currents 
in Hart’s writing.  The next subsection sets forth ten reasons to reject these few 
descriptions, rather than the other dominant currents in Hart’s writing, if we want to 
harmonize Hart’s absorption of Raz with Hart’s more basic and deeply held 
jurisprudential commitments.  
B. Ten Reasons  to Change our View of Hart’s Basic Commitments
176 Hart, supra note 174, at 126, 158.
177 Id. at 160.  
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The last subsection argued that there is an underappreciated tension in 
Hart’s texts: it is not clear whether he should be understood as committed to a form of the 
practical difference thesis that must be cashed out in narrowly first personal terms or to a 
version that makes ineliminable reference to the second personal standpoint.  There is, in 
fact, sufficient textual evidence to pin an implicit commitment to either version of the 
thesis to Hart, but the two versions are, strictly speaking, inconsistent.  This subsection
provides ten reasons to resolve this tension in favor of the broader version of the practical 
difference thesis if we are to best capture and harmonize Hart’s core jurisprudential 
commitments.  
First, although a number of commentators have correctly observed that we 
must attribute some version of the practical difference thesis to Hart,178  it should be 
remembered why exactly we must do this. One of Hart’s most important and influential 
contributions to jurisprudence was to clarify that earlier positivist accounts of the law—
such as Austin’s famous “command theory”—tended to leave out of the picture the 
characteristic ways the law figures in ordinary peoples’ lives who accept the law as 
having its particular kind of authority.179  For such people, Hart observed, the law is not 
just a matter of habitual obedience to a set of sovereign commands, and legal judgments 
are not just predictions of the relevant sanctions that legal officials are likely to 
impose.180  What is missing from accounts like these is—according to Hart—the internal 
point of view.181  As already noted, Hart ultimately described the internal point of view 
toward the law as an attitude toward it as providing us with content-independent and
peremptory guides to action as well as standards for evaluation of deviations, and for 
permitting would otherwise be resented, namely certain forms of demands for compliance 
or coercion for non-compliance.182 But if reference to the internal point of view was 
crucial to central contributions that Hart made to jurisprudence, then what we need to 
attribute to Hart to maintain these contributions is not just any version of the practical 
difference thesis, but rather the one that correctly reflects or describes the internal point 
of view of citizens and judges in real legal systems.  
For reasons already discussed, these people take the rule of recognition 
and the rules it identifies as having both first and second personal practical implications.  
These people also sometimes take certain moral criteria as grounds for concluding that 
there is a legal obligation, as in many of the examples already discussed.183  Importantly, 
adopting a version of the practical difference thesis that makes reference to the second 
personal standpoint would also be sufficient to underwrite Hart’s challenge to earlier 
positivist theories.  Indeed, one might even think that maintenance of a narrowly first 
178 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 158, at 99, 101; Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality and the Guidance of 
Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000).
179 See, e.g., HART, supra note 157, at 18-25, 50-61, 79-91.
180 See id. at 50-61, 79-91.
181 See id. at 50-61, 79-91.
182 See Hart, supra note 161, at 243, 257.  
183 See Section II(C), supra.
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personal version would invite a criticism that is very much Hartian in spirit.  The 
challenge—like Hart’s challenge to earlier positivist theories—would be that the resulting 
theories would leave out of the picture important features of how the law appears to 
ordinary participants engaged in legal practice.
Moreover, second, it is worth noting that some of Hart’s central arguments 
in The Concept of Law were directed at positivist views for which pointing out the second 
personal aspects of the internal point of view were more relevant than pointing out any 
first personal aspects.  For example, Hart spends a great deal of time arguing against 
predictive theories of law, which try to account for statements of legal obligations as
predictions of official reactions to deviations.184  When Hart says that such accounts leave 
out of the picture the characteristic ways that officials treat the rules, he is not, however,
referring to any claim that officials guide their conduct by the law in first personal 
deliberation.  For officials engaging in adjudication, the second personal consequences of 
normative breaches typically loom much larger than any first personal functions that rules 
might play in helping ordinary citizens decide what to do.  And while Hart clearly 
thought legal rules play a dual role, it would be wrong, in light of facts like these, to think 
either that his emphasis was always on first personal aspects of the internal point of view 
or that his jurisprudential contributions relied primarily on reminding us of those aspects.
Third, for reasons discussed in earlier sections, a broader practical 
difference thesis, which makes reference to the second personal standpoint, is in fact 
needed to produce a satisfying account of legal obligation.185  Hart clearly understood the 
need to distinguish obligations from mere categorical rules,186 and it was central to his 
project from start to finish to articulate an adequate account of legal obligation.187  Hart 
should not be attributed a version of the practical difference thesis that undermines ones 
of his central jurisprudential goals.  
Indeed, fourth, as the last section observed, maintaining Raz’s account of 
legal authority may force one to concede that legal obligations are less obligatory than we 
commonly perceive them to be, and to adopt a fundamentally consequentialist account of 
the law as having only the force of “indicator rules.”188  But whatever force this line of 
argument might have for Raz, Hart was absolutely clear that his goal was to provide an 
account of obligation that is true to ordinary usage.  In discussing some of Bentham’s 
failures to capture aspects of ordinary usage, Hart noted, for example, that he thought 
“Bentham would . . . have replied in a tough ‘rational reconstructionist’ or revisionist 
manner, since, for all his interest in language, he was no ordinary language philosopher 
184 See, e.g., HART, supra note 157, at 83 (“Some theorists, Austin among them, seeing perhaps the general 
irrelevance of the person’s beliefs, fears, and motives to the question whether he had an obligation to do 
something, have defined this notion not in terms of these subjective facts, but in terms of the chance or 
likelihood that the person having the obligation will suffer a punishment or ‘evil.’); id at 83-91 (arguing 
against predictive theories and pointing out that they leave the internal point of view out of the picture).
185 See Section II(C), supra.
186 See HART, supra note 157, at 82-91.
187 See, e.g., id.; Hart, supra note 161; Hart, supra note 174.
188 See Section II(C), supra.
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and his standpoint was critical and reformative.”189  Hart himself, however, declined to 
follow that lead and instead took these gaps in Bentham’s account to warrant a more 
robust account of obligation.190  Given Hart’s methodological inclinations, it seems likely 
that Hart would have resisted the analogous challenge here, which—much like 
Bentham’s work—challenges us to reform our concept of legal obligation to cohere better 
with a fundamentally consequentialist theory of value.  
Fifth, Hart shared neither Raz’s substantive normative views nor his idea 
that the only function of law was to point us toward what “right reason” would tell us to 
do as revealed in ideal first personal deliberation.191  As the last section indicated, these 
substantive normative views partly support Raz’s particular conception of how 
exclusionary reasons must purportedly function in first personal deliberation.192 Because
Hart did not share these particular normative views, however, those same motivations
would have been missing for Hart.
Indeed, sixth, parts of Raz’s work may reflect commitment to a picture of 
how the law operates that Hart was concerned to reject.  When Raz presents his service 
conception of legal authority, he says that we need to be able to understand the law not 
only as (i) providing us with exclusionary reasons to act but also as (ii) someone’s view 
on what we ought to do—i.e., as someone’s view on the very same question that we 
would ordinarily figure out using our autonomous capacities for deliberation about what 
to do absent a legal authority.193 The fact that we are inclined to picture legal directives 
as commands from some entity that can be personified may indeed reflect a deep feature 
of our ordinary language and psychology, but Hart had an ambivalent relationship to such 
pictures.  Hart notes, for example, with some approval Bentham’s idea that it can be 
helpful to make “explicit the more or less confused imagery which is buried in our use of 
[normative] expressions,” and observes that “Bentham says that in the case of obligation 
one ‘archetypal image’ is that of a man held down by a heavy weight.”194 Hart’s own 
account of legal obligation was meant in part to give us a more realistic account of 
obligation than this pre-reflective imagery could sustain,195 and another archetypal image 
in the law would seem to be that of an authoritative figure—perhaps a parental figure or a 
religious deity—who gives us commands.  Hart was, however, equally ambivalent about 
189
  Hart, supra note 174, at 137.
190 See id. at 137-61.
191 See id. at 159 (“Raz’s views on this point are . . . part of a comprehensive theory of practical reason, 
according to which normative propositions, asserting the existence of duties, committed or uncommitted, 
true or false, sincere or insincere, assert the existence of such reasons. . . .  I do not share but will not 
dispute here his cognitive account of moral judgment in terms of objective reasons for action.”).
192 See Section II(C), supra.
193 See JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 194, 202 (1994)
(“[A] directive can be authoritatively binding only if it is, or is at least presented as, someone’s view of 
how subjects ought to behave.”).
194
  Hart, supra note 174, at 131.
195 See, e.g., HART, supra note 157, at 83-84, 87-91.
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moving from such imagery to full blown command theories of law, and, while he thought 
that the idea of trying to account for the law on the model of sovereign commands might 
provide a useful starting point, command models were ultimately something he 
rejected.196  This rejection would have plausibly brought with it a rejection of the idea 
that we must always be able to understand the law—in the final analysis, and not just as a 
pre-reflective picture of how things seem to go—as someone’s view as to what we ought 
to do.  
In any event, seventh, it is not at all clear that commands only have 
genuine practical effects when they provide us with independent means of figuring out 
what we ought to do better than first personal deliberation would.  In ordinary 
circumstances, a command will, of course, probably only be useful if it can change the 
way the addressee would have acted—such that saying “do what you ought to do” will 
ordinarily say nothing very useful.  But this is only true in central cases of commands, 
and there are other cases.  For example, a parent, after learning of her child’s struggle 
deciding between various suitors, one part of which arises from a sense of familial duty,
might, upon reflection, tell the child: “Do what you ultimately think is best.”  The 
practical effect of this command would then be to relinquish any second personal claim 
against the child for engaging in unfettered first personal deliberation on this important 
life decision, and, perhaps, even to generate some second personal standing to complain 
if the child does not do so with a free and clear conscience.
Eighth, Raz’s account of legal authority gains considerable plausibility to 
the degree that instances in which judges decide legal cases on moral grounds are 
relatively peripheral to the law.  This is because Raz frames his account as one of the 
nature of law.  Hart, however, appeared to view the legal incorporation of morality as 
central to the law.  In the opening sections of The Concept of Law, Hart listed, for 
example, as one of the three major factors that tend to generate jurisprudential 
perplexities the following:  
[n]ot only do law and morals share a vocabulary so that there are both legal and 
moral obligations, duties, and rights; but all municipal legal systems reproduce 
the substance of certain fundamental moral requirements.  Killing and the wanton 
use of violence are only the most obvious examples of the coincidence between 
the prohibitions of law and morals.197
A version of the practical difference thesis that allows the law to prohibit the same things 
that morality does in a large and central range of cases would thus be truer to the spirit of 
Hart’s views.  
Ninth, some of the pressure towards Raz’s particular version of the 
practical difference thesis arises from a specific and controversial view of Raz’s: namely, 
that to sincerely believe a person is under a legal obligation one must believe (rightly or 
wrongly) that that same person is under a moral obligation.  Hart, however, explicitly 
rejects this part of Raz’s views.198 Hart thought that it was perfectly possible—and, 
196 See, e.g., id. at 18-91.
197 HART, supra note 157, at 7.
198 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 174, at 153-61.
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indeed, that it was a critically important distinction between law and morality—that 
judges be able to sincerely believe that someone is under a legal obligation without that 
person necessarily being under a moral obligation.199  Even late in his career, Hart says, 
for example, that:
at least where the law is clearly settled and determinate, judges, in speaking of 
the subject’s legal duty, may mean to speak in a technically confined way.  They 
speak as judges, from within a legal institution which they are committed as 
judges to maintain, in order to draw attention to what by way of action is ‘owed’ 
by the subject, that is, may legally be demanded or exacted from him.  Judges 
may combine with this, moral judgment and exhortation especially when they 
approve of the content of specific laws, but this is not a necessary implication of 
their statements of the subject’s legal duty.200
From the first personal perspective of deliberation, it can, however, be 
very difficult to identify what it would mean to sincerely believe that one is under a legal 
but not a moral obligation.  This is because both morality and law seem to provide us 
with exclusionary reasons for action that are general in application.  Hence, from the first 
personal perspective of deliberation, there does not appear to be any relevant difference 
between the thought that one has a genuine legal obligation and the thought that the 
obligation has moral force.  For reasons already discussed, however, relevant practical 
differences do emerge once we attend to the second personal standpoint.  A broader 
version of the practical difference thesis may therefore be needed to make the distinction 
that Hart consistently wanted to make between sincere belief in the existence of a legal as 
opposed to a moral obligation.  The fact that adopting the present account allows for the 
clarification and maintenance of one of Hart’s central distinctions is yet another reason to 
think that this account better captures Hart’s core philosophical commitments.
Tenth, it should not be forgotten that Hart was well versed in Raz’s 
arguments, including his arguments that absorbing his work on legal authority would 
create inconsistencies for inclusive legal positivism.  Still, Hart neither refused to absorb 
Raz’s contributions nor accepted that there was any genuine inconsistency.  Facts like 
these do not warrant simple deference to Hart’s views.  But where, as here, Hart 
apparently had a probing understanding of the issues, and where his work can be further 
refined in two different ways—one of which makes his position internally coherent—
Hart should be attributed a developing sense of the coherent position.  This is not blind 
deference, but rather use of a basic and seemingly applicable principle of charity of 
interpretation.  
For these ten reasons, Hart would (or at least should) have welcomed the 
account developed here as an appropriate development and refinement of his basic views.  
He would have thought of the views developed here as providing the best basic 
framework for further developments in analytic jurisprudence, and as helping to capture 
what is importantly true and helpful about inclusive legal positivist theory.
199 See id.
200
  Hart, supra note 161, at 266.
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IV. SHAPIRO AND A MORE COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING
OF HOW THE LAW FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIVES
The preceding sections have argued that the best way to harmonize Hart’s 
basic philosophical commitments, while absorbing Raz’s contributions to our 
understanding of legal authority, is to adopt a specific version of the practical difference 
thesis, which allows law’s obligatory nature to show up in practice either in the first or 
the second personal perspectives in specific ways.  None of the above arguments have, 
however, directly addressed the more recent and influential arguments for exclusive legal 
positivism due to Scott Shapiro.201  Even if Hart would (or should) have welcomed the 
position developed here as representing the best basic framework within which to 
develop and further refine positivist thought, Shapiro’s recent work provides an 
independent set of arguments that might cast doubt on the internal consistency of such a 
position.  The purpose of this section is to examine Shapiro’s arguments, and to extend 
the present account of legal obligation to address his concerns.  
Shapiro’s arguments resemble Raz’s in the following important sense: 
they purport to identify an inconsistency between Hart’s commitments to 
incorporationism and the conventionality thesis, on the one hand, and the practical 
difference thesis (as properly construed) on the other.202 Before examining these 
arguments, there are, however, two features of Shapiro’s views that I would like to 
highlight because they are, in my view, genuine strengths of his position.  
First, as earlier sections have suggested, one of the motivations behind 
Raz’s particular version of exclusive legal positivism is the idea that the normal function 
of law is to provide us with authoritative marks that allow us to identify what we ought to 
do, as revealed in ideal first personal moral deliberation, better than we could ourselves 
through unaided deliberation.  I suggested that this part of Raz’s thought reflects 
commitment to a form of moral foundationalism—or the view that law’s authority must 
in some way be reduced to or derived from moral authority—and observed that 
foundationalism of this kind has been questioned in many other areas of philosophy.  
Importantly, Shapiro’s arguments for exclusive legal positivism, which will be discussed 
in a moment, do not depend on any such commitment.203  Shapiro believes instead that 
one of the functions of law is to help produce coordination over the content of what we 
201
  Shapiro began these arguments in The Difference Rules Make, reprinted in ANALYZING LAW: NEW 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33 (Brian Bix ed., 1998); and On Hart’s Way Out, reprinted in HART’S 
POSTSCRIPT 149 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) [hereinafter “Shapiro I”].  His most recent and mature 
formulation of the arguments appear in Law, Morality and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127 
(2000) [hereinafter “Shapiro II”].
202 See, e.g., Shapiro I, supra note 201, at 149, 158 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001); Shapiro II, supra note 201, 
at 127 (“The Conventionality Thesis, coupled with inclusive legal positivism, turns out to be inconsistent 
with another core commitment of Hart’s positivism, which might be called the “Practical Difference 
Thesis.”). 
203 See, e.g., Shapiro I, supra note 201, at 149, 178  n.57 (pointing out that for Raz, legal rules mediate 
between persons and the reasons that apply to them absent legal authority, whereas for Shapiro, legal rules 
mediate between competing standards of conduct).
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owe to one another, where the content and authority of the legal norms in question need 
not be reducible to, or derivable from, anything that our unaided sense of right and wrong 
might allow us to perceive, even in ideal conditions.204  The way Shapiro puts this point 
is to say that one of the functions of law is to provide us with authoritative marks that 
allow us to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate norms, and to do so from among all of 
the logically possible norms that may compete for our allegiance.205  As stated, this 
position is thus consistent with a number of different accounts of legal legitimacy, 
including non-foundationalist ones, which do not depend on accepting Raz’s service 
conception of legitimate authority.  To the extent that Shapiro’s arguments are 
independent of this particular conception of legitimate authority, Shapiro’s arguments 
present a more robust argument for exclusive legal positivism.
Second, as will become clearer below, Shapiro’s arguments do not 
ultimately depend on the claim that the law must be capable of providing us with 
exclusionary practical guidance.  They depend only on the more minimal claim that the 
law must be capable of providing us with practical guidance of some kind or other.  This 
fact might seem beside the point with respect to the main arguments in this Article.  
Earlier sections have already acknowledged that legal obligations should be understood 
as purporting to have some exclusionary force.  For reasons discussed below, however, 
Shapiro’s work has helped remind us of the need to examine carefully the distinct ways 
the rule of recognition and the law can sometimes function in judges’ and citizens’ lives, 
respectively.  A closer examination of these issues will reveal that Shapiro’s more general 
test is needed to capture some aspects of this practical guidance.
Let us turn, then, to an examination of Shapiro’s arguments for exclusive 
legal positivism.  As already noted, these arguments depend on revealing a purported 
inconsistency between Hart’s commitments to inclusive legal positivism and the practical 
difference thesis, properly construed.  In Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct,206
Shapiro sets forth in very clear terms the relevant test he thinks we should employ to 
determine whether a given rule can make a practical difference in our lives. Here is 
Shapiro’s initial formulation of the test:  
In order to evaluate whether a rule is capable of making a practical difference, we 
begin by considering cases where an agent conforms to a rule as a result of 
appealing to it in his practical reasoning.  We then engage in the following 
thought experiment: We consider what the world would have been like had the 
agent not appealed to the rule in his practical reasoning.  If the agent might not 
have conformed to the rule, then we say that the rule does make a practical 
difference for him, and therefore, is capable of making a practical difference.  If, 
however, the agent would have conformed to the rule even if he had not appealed 
204 See, e.g. id. at 178  n.57.
205 See, e.g., Shapiro I, supra note 201, at 149, 177 (“Marks of authority are supposed to eliminate the 
problems associated with people distinguishing for themselves between legitimate and illegitimate 
norms.”); id. at 189: (“[G]iven the multitude of standards available, there must be some rule by which 
people can determine which standards ought to guide their conduct.”). 
206
  6 LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000).
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to it, then we say that the rule is not capable of making a practical difference for 
that agent.  If the rule is not capable of making a practical difference for any 
agent, then we can say that the rule is not capable of making a practical 
difference simpliciter.207
Notice that this formulation tests for practical differences simpliciter rather than for the 
narrower class of exclusionary practical differences. 
As Shapiro recognizes, there is, however, an important difference between 
appealing to a rule and appealing to it as a legal rule.208  If, for example, both morality 
and law require that we keep a given promise, then the relevant question to ask will 
presumably be whether the fact that the law requires that we keep the promise can make a 
difference in our practical reasoning, a difference that is independent of anything arising 
from the fact that there is a moral rule (or some other kind of unadorned rule) that 
requires the very same thing.  Because of facts like this, Shapiro rightly says the 
following:  
I now think that a slightly more nuanced test is needed.  The complication is that 
an agent can appeal to a rule under several different descriptions.  She might, for 
example, appeal to a rule because the rule is a moral rule, although the rule is 
also a legal rule.  It is possible that the rule may make practical difference as a 
moral rule, but not as a legal rule.  In order to determine, therefore, whether a 
legal rule makes a difference qua legal rule, it will not be enough to ask whether 
the agent might not have conformed if that agent had not appealed to the rule.   
We will ask whether the agent might not have conformed if that agent had not 
appealed to the rule as a legal rule.  If the agent might not have conformed to 
such a rule if the appeal is not made under that description, then we will say that 
the rule did make a difference to the agent’s practical reasoning as a legal rule.209
This amendment does, indeed, seem needed to test for the relevant class of practical 
differences.
There are, finally, two other wrinkles to this test that should be mentioned 
before applying it.  First, Shapiro defines the way a person can “conform to a rule” under 
this test in a way that is broad enough to capture both instances of citizens doing what the 
law requires of them, as primary addressees of the legal directives, and judges applying 
the law and rendering verdicts about citizens’ conduct in ways that are consistent with the 
law.210  This broadened definition is needed to capture the forms of practical differences 
that the law must presumably be capable of making in our lives in both contexts.
Second, as Shapiro has helpfully observed, rules can in fact make relevant 
practical differences in our lives in more than one way.   One important distinction is 
207 Id. at 132.
208 See id.
209 Id.  
210 See id. at 133.
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between what Shapiro calls “epistemic” and “motivational” guidance.211 Let us assume 
that a citizen learns, in some manner or other, that it is against the law to perform a given 
action.  The person would be “motivationally” guided by the law if the person were to 
take the brute fact that it is against the law as a reason for action, and if that belief were to 
cause the person to refrain from performing the illegal action.212  The person might, 
however, not take the law to have that particular kind of authority and still be guided by 
the law to conform with the law in another sense.  This would occur if knowledge of what 
the law was were to play a role in getting the citizen to conform to the law but only 
because the citizen was motivated by things like the fear of sanctions that would likely 
accompany a violation of the law.213  Shapiro calls this “epistemic guidance.”214  Shapiro 
then notes—rightly, in my view—that the law need not ordinarily be concerned with the 
reasons that a citizen conforms to the law so long as they conform.  Shapiro thinks that 
Hart is nevertheless committed to the idea that the officials of a system must be 
motivationally guided by the law.  He thus says that “Hart’s claim about the guidance 
function of law . . . turns out to be a composite claim: the law’s primary function is to 
epistemically guide the conduct of its ordinary citizens via primary rules and to 
motivationally guide the conduct of judicial officials via its secondary rules.”215
In a moment, I will add some further refinements to this part of Shapiro’s 
discussion.  For present purposes, however, the important point to recognize is that 
Shapiro’s test captures cases of both epistemic and motivational guidance.  This is 
because the test asks us to begin with cases where an agent “conforms to a rule as a result 
of appealing to it in his practical reasoning.”  Appealing to a rule can, however, result in 
such conformity either due to the rule’s epistemic or motivational guidance.  Shapiro’s 
test is thus robust enough to capture an adequate range of relevant types of practical 
guidance.
The foregoing discussion should clarify the test that Shapiro proposes we 
use to check for relevant practical differences.  The remainder of this section will accept 
this test at face value and ask whether its application really must lead to the results 
Shapiro suggests.  Use of this tack should not be interpreted as indicating that there are 
no other grounds for reservation about Shapiro’s formulation or about other steps in his 
arguments.  Rather, this tack has been chosen because it clarifies what reflection on the 
second personal standpoint can reveal that is distinctive for this debate.    
To determine whether the law can provide us with relevant practical 
guidance if it is identified by means of an inclusive rule of recognition, let us examine a 
test case.  Consider a rule of recognition, one part of which can be expressed as follows: 
“In circumstances where someone has made a promise that is supported by consideration, 
that person has a legal obligation to follow through with the promise if, but only if, 
211 See, e.g., Shapiro I, supra note 201, at 149, 173.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 Id. at  175.
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morality would so require.”  This rule of recognition instructs that we identify what our 
legal obligations are by relying on moral insight, in at least a specified set of 
circumstances.  The rule also makes the existence of a moral obligation both a necessary 
and a sufficient condition of our having a legal obligation in those same circumstances.  
If this rule were consistent with the practical difference thesis, as properly construed, then 
two important versions of inclusive legal positivism would thus be shown to be consistent
with this thesis: namely, both what Shapiro calls “the most important versions” of 
inclusive legal positivism, which “permit morality to be a sufficient condition of 
legality,” and those that “relegate morality to a possible necessary condition of 
legality.”216
Whether we have a legal obligation under this particular rule of 
recognition need not turn out to be a simple question.  It is sometimes said that morality 
requires that we keep all of our promises, but this is probably something of an 
overstatement, and the rule of recognition under discussion will incorporate our moral 
reasoning in all of its complexity and nuance.  If, for example, one were to make a 
promise that is supported by consideration, but the promise were induced by deception, 
then whether one would be legally required to follow through with the promise under this 
rule would depend on whether one were morally required to follow through with 
promises that are fraudulently induced.  Presumably, the answer to this last question is 
no.  In order to simplify the example, let us therefore fix the context so that we are 
looking at a case in which a person has made a promise that is supported by consideration 
and in which morality would require that the person follow through with the promise.  
Let us also focus on the kinds of practical differences that arise for judges rather than 
ordinary citizens.  Shapiro’s arguments are meant to show that use of an inclusive rule of 
recognition like this is inconsistent with the full range of practical differences that the law 
must be capable of making in such judges lives.  Is this true?
Shapiro believes—rightly—that we should have no trouble seeing how an 
inclusive rule of recognition like this could itself make a practical difference in our lives 
under his test.217  We just need to begin by looking at the case in which a judge finds that 
the given promise is legally enforceable (and thereby conforms to the rule of recognition) 
as a result of appealing to the rule of recognition.  We then need to imagine a possible 
world in which the judge does not appeal to this same rule as a law-identifying rule, and 
ask if the judge might not have come to the same decision.  There are many possible 
worlds in which the applicable rule of recognition has a different content.  Let us 
therefore look at the possible world in which the relevant rule of recognition says instead 
that promises are never legally enforceable.  In such a world, the judge would have 
appealed to this alternative rule as a law-identifying rule, and would have come to a 
different legal conclusion.  This shows that the original (inclusive) rule of recognition is 
indeed capable of making a practical difference in the judge’s legal reasoning.    
216
   Shapiro II, supra note 201, at 127, 131.
217 See, e.g., Shapiro I, supra note 201, at 149, 179 (noting that the problem is not with the inclusive rule of 
recognition).
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The problem—Shapiro thinks—comes only at the next step,218 when we 
try to see whether the primary rule that is picked out by this inclusive rule of recognition 
(namely, that “one should keep one’s promise in these circumstances”) can still make a 
relevant practical difference as a legal rule.  Here again we are to start by imagining the 
case in which a judge finds the promise legally enforceable because she appeals to the 
inclusive rule of recognition and then to the moral rule that it incorporates as a legal rule.  
We are then to imagine a possible world in which the judge does not appeal to this same 
moral rule as a legal rule.  If, however, we assume—as Shapiro does—that moral rules 
are necessarily true,219 and if we hold the inclusive rule of recognition fixed, there would 
seem to be no possible world in which the judge would come to a different decision.  The 
only possible worlds that would seem to be relevant are ones in which the judge figures 
out what the inclusive rule of recognition identifies as the law by deferring to some other 
authority rather than directly to the moral norm.220  But since this should lead to the same 
result, treating this other authority as a legal rule should yield the same legal decision.  
Here is how Shapiro puts the argument:  
To test whether such moral rules can guide conduct, we should ask whether this 
judge might have acted differently had he not appealed to such rules as legal 
rules in his practical reasoning.  We thus pose the following counterfactual 
question: If the judge had not appealed to those moral rules as legal norms in his 
deliberations, would he have been motivated to conform to those norms anyway 
in his evaluations?221
According to Shapiro, “[t]he answer to this question appears to be yes.”222  Shapiro 
explains: “Because the rule of recognition will require the judge to evaluate conduct in 
accordance with rules that are morally appropriate, his evaluative practices will conform 
to the moral norms regardless of whether he directly appealed to these norms themselves 
as legal rules.”223  The conclusion that Shapiro draws from this is that if an inclusive rule 
of recognition can make a practical difference, then the moral rules that it incorporates 
cannot make a practical difference in judges’ reasoning.224  And this is supposed to show 
218 See id.; Shapiro II, supra note 201, at 127, 133-34.
219 See, e.g., id. at 139 (“Moral rules do not go in and out of existence.  If, at some time, some rule is 
morally valid, then it is always morally valid.”); see also Shapiro I, supra note 201, at 149, 181.
220 See id. at 133.
221 Id. at 133. 
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See id.; see also, Scott J. Shapiro, The Difference Rules Make, reprinted in ANALYZING LAW: NEW 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33, 57 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) (“[I]f a legal agent is to be guided by the master 
rule which sates ‘Act in accordance with the rules of morality when the law is controversial’, he cannot be 
guided by the rules which constitute morality.”).
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that only an exclusive rule of recognition is consistent with Hart’s practical difference 
thesis.225
Notice, however, that Shapiro’s argument focuses on the kinds of 
differences that can show up by treating something other than the moral rule as a legal 
rule.  Shapiro does not countenance those possible worlds in which the judge treats the 
same moral rule as the relevant standard for evaluation, but does not treat it as a 
specifically legal rule.  In these possible worlds, the judge would still conclude that the 
breach of the promise was wrongful, and would thus necessarily evaluate the conduct as 
wrongful in a sense.  But she would not take the wrong that is so identified to warrant the 
specific second personal standing to raise a legal claim for non-compliance as she did in 
the original hypothetical.  Treating the wrong as a specifically legal wrong can thus 
generate genuine practical differences for the judge, although the relevant practical 
differences will show up in second personal terms, and not in terms of conclusions about 
what one ought or ought not do considered from the first personal perspective or in less 
charged applications of the relevant standard.
Some care must be taken in understanding the possibility that is under 
discussion.  Hart clearly believed that the ordinary attitude of a judge toward the law is to 
treat both the rule of recognition as the relevant and authoritative standard for identifying 
what the law requires, and the law itself as having the specific authority that it purports to 
have to generate legal obligations.226  Though Hart is right that these attitudes typically 
come together, they are at least logically separable.  Consider, for example, the ordinary 
citizen who, out of sincere moral conviction, deeply distrusts her legal system and does 
not accord it any genuine authority.  This citizen might nevertheless feel that she will 
repeatedly encounter troubles with the law, and will be unable to change the law for the 
better, without an intimate and personal understanding of what the law requires.  This 
person might therefore decide that it is in her best interests to enter law school to learn for 
herself the conventions by which the law of her society is identified.  This person might 
then use the rule of recognition to guide her conclusions as to what the law does or does 
not require in many cases.  In taking certain grounds to warrant these conclusions, and/or 
to provide grounds for criticizing others’ judgments as correct or incorrect, she would be 
exhibiting an internal acceptance of the rule of recognition as a law identifying standard 
225
   Shapiro’s reasons for thinking that the same consequences do not follow for exclusive rules of 
recognition are as follows.  An exclusive rule of recognition can itself make practical differences in a 
judge’s reasoning for the same reasons observed in the main text in relation to inclusive rules of 
recognition.  But when an exclusive rule of recognition tells judges to treat as a legal rule any rule that 
arises from a particular source—say from a particular form of legislation—there are possible worlds in 
which different legislation has been passed, and in which the this fact would thus lead the judges to 
different legal conclusions.  Hence, the primary rules that are identified by an exclusive rule of recognition 
as legal rules can indeed make the kind of practical differences that Shapiro’s test picks out. See, e.g., 
Shapiro II, supra note 201, at 127, 133-34.
226 For example, Hart asks at one point in Legal Duty and Obligation: “What then is it for judges to accept 
or endorse such rules of recognition and so derivatively to accept or endorse the laws which such rules 
require them to apply?”  Hart, supra note 174, at 126, 155. Although this statement acknowledges a 
distinction between these two forms of acceptance, the passage also suggests that Hart thinks that they 
typically come together in the attitudes of an ordinary judge.  See id.
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in a sense.  Her conclusions about what the law requires would, however, be what Hart 
called “external” rather than “internal” legal judgments: they would not express 
acceptance of the law’s authority.227  These judgments might also guide her actions, but 
they would do so only epistemically—to use Shapiro’s terms.  This person might do what 
the law requires out of a fear of sanctions, for example, or perhaps to infiltrate into 
mainstream legal society to effect certain changes in the law.  But the brute fact that 
something is required by law would do nothing to move her.  
There is, moreover, nothing far-fetched about pointing out this possibility 
for present purposes.  As an initial matter, the possibility does not seem far- fetched at all 
as a description of some ordinary citizens’ psychologies, at least in some frames of mind.  
The possibility may occur much less frequently with regard to people who find their way 
into judicial roles, but the important point to recognize here is that the possibility picks 
out perfectly an important distinction that is critical for the present argument.  This is the 
distinction between treating an inclusive rule of recognition as setting forth the genuine 
grounds for judgments that something is (or is not) required by law—where the law is 
thought of as a system of rules that happen to operate in one’s system but that has no real 
authority—and treating it as a rule that helps one identify genuine obligations, which 
have the full authority that internal acceptance of the law brings with it.  
This difference is also precisely what is needed to seal the present 
argument, because it brings with it real practical consequences, which show up second 
personally.  To see this, let us return to the inclusive rule of recognition that we have 
been using as a test case, and stipulate that the citizen under discussion has become a 
judge.  This newly minted judge might look at the breach of the promise under 
discussion, and, employing the inclusive rule of recognition, recognize that this was 
indeed the breach of a legal obligation.  In coming to this conclusion, she would be 
relying in part on her sense that there was a moral obligation to fulfill the promise, such 
that failure to do so was genuinely wrong (in a moral sense).  We have assumed that this 
judge rejects the law’s authority on moral grounds, so the judge would also believe that 
the promisee had the second personal standing to be morally indignant, or to react in 
certain ways to the breach, and may even feel personally condemning toward the breach.  
The judge’s internal acceptance of the rule of recognition as a law-identifying standard 
would also lead the judge to the external legal judgment that the law requires that the 
person fulfill the promise.  But absent an internal acceptance of the law itself, the judge 
might not think that any of this shows that the promisee has any second personal standing 
to raise a specifically legal claim or that any of the typical legal consequences that would 
follow from a successful claim are permissible or warranted.  The new judge’s distaste 
for the law may run so deep that she may think that this particular kind of standing never 
really exists, and may think that these particular consequences are never genuinely 
warranted or permissible.  She might—in other words—be occupying her role only to 
subvert it; and, while she her legal judgments about standing, and the like, might guide 
227 See, e.g., HART, supra note 157, at 88-91.  Hart says that “external statements” are descriptive 
statements about the law, made by someone who is not a participant and/or by someone who does not 
necessarily accept the law’s authority.  “Internal statements” are, by contrast, statements made by those 
who take the law to have its particular kind of authority, and, hence, as something that gives rise to genuine 
guides to conduct, genuine grounds for criticizing deviations as right or wrong, and genuine permissions or 
warrants for what would otherwise be resented, namely demands for compliance or coercion for non-
compliance.  See id.
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her conduct, they would do so only epistemically, and need not do so at all.  By contrast, 
treating the moral rule as a legal rule, and with the full sense of authority that internal 
acceptance of the law brings with it, would have just these further practical 
consequences.  Hence, the moral rule that is picked out by the inclusive rule of 
recognition can indeed make a relevant practical difference as a legal rule, even under 
Shapiro’s test, and even given the rest of his assumptions.  
Now, as Shapiro has rightly observed in response to a different critic, his 
arguments for exclusive legal positivism cannot be undermined simply by changing the 
relevant sense of practical guidance in an arbitrary manner.  As Shapiro puts it: “selecting 
the appropriate conception of rule-guided behavior is not like picking the right pair of 
socks to go with one’s shoes.”228  It should therefore be conceded that the above 
argument depends in part on broadening the range of practical differences that we take as 
relevant.  But the parsing that is being proposed here is in no way arbitrary.  For reasons 
discussed in the previous sections, there are numerous philosophical and textual reasons 
for thinking that it is ultimately the better interpretation of the relevant practical 
difference thesis that should be used in trying to understand Hart’s views and elaborate a 
satisfying account of the law.  In fact, there is an important sense in which the more 
narrowly focused first personal version of the thesis, which Shapiro and others have been 
using to date, can itself be seen to be arbitrary: the narrower version was not so much 
consciously chosen as it was forced upon us in part by lack of any clearly defined 
alternatives that make appropriate reference to the second personal standpoint.  Darwall’s 
recent work has helped clarify that there are, however, other genuine options, which 
better capture the rich ways that obligations function in our practical lives.  Hence, we 
can now make the relevant choice, and, ultimately, as Shapiro observes, “[T]he positivist 
is committed to subscribing to the conception of rule-guided behavior that is correct, or at 
least as correct as all others.”229  The same is clearly true for the non-positivist.  
For reasons discussed in the body of this Article, the correct conception of 
the practical difference thesis is—I submit—one that references the second personal 
standpoint, either in the ways described here or in ways very much like them.  Adopting 
this version of the practical difference thesis would avoid many of the well-known 
problems associated with harmonizing inclusive legal positivism with the practical 
difference thesis.  Adopting this version of the practical difference thesis would also 
render a number of non-positivist accounts of the law—such as Dworkinean interpretivist 
accounts—consistent with our best understanding of how legal authority and legal 
obligation function.  If this is right, then this new version of inclusive legal positivism is 
an internally consistent and viable account of the law, which represents the best available 
framework within which to develop and further refine positivist accounts of the law.  If 
this is right, we will, moreover, ultimately need to choose between positivist and non-
positivist accounts of the law on grounds other than those arising from the nature of legal 
authority.  
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